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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on three of the most important questions in
entrepreneurship study, namely venture financing, corporate strategy and firm
performance. The main thrust of the dissertation is to elaborate the mechanisms through
which institutional and social factors impact entrepreneurial activities in developing
countries.
The first essay, "Evaluation or Attention", examines the causal mechanisms of
social ties in venture financing. A staged model of network effects is developed, showing
that the prior literature has drawn erroneous conclusions about the role of social ties as
they conflate VC's evaluation of entrepreneurs with the necessary preceding act of
becoming aware of them.
The second essay, coauthored with Yasheng Huang, examines the institutional
driver of local entrepreneur's foreign direct investment (FDI) seeking behavior. We find
that the Chinese economic system has a political pecking order in which private
enterprises are located at the bottom. FDI-seeking behavior, while diluting local
entrepreneurs' ownership controls, helps change their firms' political status to transcend
institutional constraints.
The third essay examines the role of bureaucratic legacy upon entrepreneurial
performance. I find that Chinese entrepreneurs with work experiences in the public sector
have better access to state controlled resources but low efficiency in utilizing these
resources. This pattern reflects that entrepreneurs are organizational products: individuals'
past work experiences shape both their positions within the social structure and the
organizational blueprints that they transfer to new ventures.
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Introduction
RIDING THE DRAGON: ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER MARKET
TRANSITION
My dissertation's title, "Riding the Dragon", refers not only to the empirical
context that I am examining, but also to the various opportunities and risks that private
entrepreneurs face in transitional economies. On the one hand, the legacy of "shortage
economy" (Kornai, 1992) has created many unfulfilled market niches in former socialist
countries and successful entrepreneurs often grow their firms at a skyrocketing speed. On
the other hand, market supporting institutions are underdeveloped in these economies and
entrepreneurs often fall victims to the government's "grabbing hands". From these
perspectives, entrepreneurship under market transition is exactly like riding a dragon -
while one may rise fast, he may also fall down in a hard way! Thus, studying the various
strategies that entrepreneurs adopt to overcome institutional voids has important
implications, both theoretically and practically.
My choice of China is based on its obvious significance in the world economy
and that I have a wealth of personal and research experience. Born in the last year of the
Cultural Revolution, I was raised in the reform years. I have personally witnessed how
the lives of billions have been changed and what a central role that entrepreneurship has
played in the process of China's transition. At the same time, I have also witnessed many
entrepreneurs whose ventures failed due to governmental policies that were originally
designed to make a positive change in the economy. I wish that my study will shed light
on our understanding of dynamics of entrepreneurial activities in China and help both the
decision making of (potential) entrepreneurs and policy makers in China and beyond its
national border.
My research has two main themes. The first theme examines the positive and
negative aspects of social ties on entrepreneurial success. My goal is to reveal the various
tradeoffs that individuals have to make when their economic actions are embedded in
social relationships. The second theme looks at how institutional factors shape
entrepreneurial behaviors and performance. My goal is to show how well-intentioned
policies may create economic distortions and force entrepreneurs to adopt various
nonmarket strategies. Even though I look at the traditional sectors as well, my main focus
is on China's high-tech firms and the quickly emerging venture capital industries. These
sectors are the most knowledge-intensive. They are not only the new engine of economic
growth in China but also are shaping the global landscape of technology innovation and
competition. In the section below, I briefly outline my research.
Social Networks for Developing Economy Entrepreneurs
In "Evaluation or Attention: How do Social Ties Matter in Venture Financing", I
examine high-tech firms' pursuit of venture capital (VC) to understand the mechanisms
through which social networks influence the decision-making process of resource holders.
In particular, while prior research has found a positive correlation between social ties
with VCs and entrepreneurs' access to capital, these studies conflate the evaluation of
entrepreneurs with the necessary preceding act of becoming aware of them. My research
challenges the established wisdom, arguing that while better-networked entrepreneurs are
advantaged in terms of getting the initial attention of investors, this advantage does not
carry over to the next stage of evaluation. By collapsing the two stages together prior
studies have come to erroneous conclusions about the role of social networks.
Disentangling these two stages empirically raises a key inferential challenge which I
solve. Specifically, one needs exogenous variation in entrepreneurs' social networks that
is caused neither by the venture's business opportunities nor the unobserved
characteristics of entrepreneurs. Without a setting that captures such variation, it is hard
to isolate the effect of social networks on advantages such as access to venture financing
from other factors that simultaneously affect the advantage and tie formation.
My approach is to exploit intra-entrepreneur variation of ties to venture capitalists:
an entrepreneur often approaches several VC firms for funding and usually does not have
previous ties with all of them. Using this variation, combined with entrepreneur level
fixed-effects enables me to directly study how social ties affect the chances of gaining a
VC's attention. One key advantage of this method is that it rules out the possibility that
the observed network effect can be explained by entrepreneur or firm level characteristics
that may influence tie formation and VC attention at the same time. Using a unique
dataset collected through fieldwork in China, I find that an entrepreneur is more likely to
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gain an interview offer from a connected VC firm as opposed to one from outside the
entrepreneur's network. However, evidence also suggests that firms benefiting from
social ties in the first stage are less likely to be selected for funding in the second stage.
These results imply that social bonds impose constraints upon VCs in granting interviews
as they are influenced, indeed sometimes even coerced, to take into consideration some
firms that they might not otherwise investigate.
In "Bureaucracy and Entrepreneurship under Market Transition", I explore a
different aspect of social ties and their influence on entrepreneurship. Rather than focus
on the positive value of social ties - for example in gaining introductions, resources etc. -
I examine the little explored "down side" of social networks showing how entrepreneurs'
connections with the state may hold them back from growing their firms' competitiveness.
The fact that bureaucrats enjoyed large economic advantages over the rest of the society
is an extremely robust empirical finding in the context of state-controlled economies.
However, the literature has no consensus regarding the capability of bureaucrats to retain
these advantages during market transition. The elite retention theory argues that former
cadres can rely on connections and administrative expertise acquired under state
socialism to maintain high economic status in the post-socialist era. However, the market
transition theory has argued that cadres will lose their advantages due to the decline of
the state's redistributive power in the emergence of a market society. A recent literature
has particularly argued that "the realities of bureaucratic life are fundamentally
incompatible with the development of entrepreneurial initiative" (Sorensen, 2007),
suggesting bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs perform poorly.
My research reconciles these two perspectives. Using a nationally representative
survey of private entrepreneurs in China, I find that, compared with entrepreneurs whose
careers did not include time in the state sector, bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are more
likely to access key external resources such as bank credit and so grow their firms to
larger sizes. However, bureaucratic experiences also have a detrimental effect, as firms of
bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs do not utilize resources efficiently and suffer from
productivity losses. My findings suggest that career experiences can drive two distinctive
causal mechanisms that each impact different dimensions of entrepreneurial success. On
one hand, individuals' career paths define their external networks and social legitimacy.
From this perspective, bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are more likely to develop ties
with state institutions that continue to control key resources such as banking credits and
hold suspicious views of the newly emerged private sector. On the other hand,
individuals internalize their former employers' corporate cultures and imprint their
organizational routines. From this perspective, bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs may
inherit the "soft-budget constraint" and other state-sector characteristics that are not
compatible with the newly established market rules.
Institutional Drivers of Entrepreneurship
Beyond the two papers described above, I am also working to understand the
relationship between institutional context (more broadly defined than social networks)
and entrepreneurs' choice of organizational form. My working paper "Institutional
Constraints and Entrepreneurs' FDI Seeking Behaviors" (with Yasheng Huang)
challenges the notion that the prevalence of foreign direct investment (FDI) indicates the
host country's institutional strength in protecting private enterprises. We argue that local
firms' preference for an ownership arrangement (namely FDI) rather than contractual
arrangement in their partnership with foreign firms represents an institutional bias against
local entrepreneurs that prevents them from accessing key economic resources for growth.
Specifically, there is a political pecking order in China where foreign invested enterprises
rank much higher than private local firms. As a result, FDI helps local private enterprises
to change their ownership status and transcend institutional constraints. To test these
arguments, we leverage wide variation in firm ownership and institutional context among
Chinese regions, together with a dataset of a nationally representative sample of non-state
owned enterprises. We find that FDI indeed is more attractive for firms in poor
institutional environments and the effect is particularly strong for private entrepreneurs,
who are at the bottom of China's political pecking order.
These three essays, while covering a wide range of outcome variables, have a
common theme: in China, a developing country where market-supporting institutions are
underdeveloped, entrepreneurs and other economic actors have to rely on non-market
strategies for their ventures' survival and growth and these strategies do not come
without a cost - for venture capitalists, while social ties transfer "soft information" that
reduces investment uncertainty and risks, these ties also enact social obligation and
reduce investors' flexibility in attention allocation; for (potential) entrepreneurs, while
work experience in the public sector helps develop connections with the state, such a
career path also exposes these individuals to inefficient organizational routines and
bureaucratic cultures; for private enterprise owners, while foreign enterprise status helps
overcome domestic political discrimination, this forces them to split firm ownership
without necessarily being compensated with technological/managerial knowhow. It might
have been a coincidence for the three essays to fall into the same theme. However, as a
Chinese, I'd like to say it is the wisdom of my ancestors that inspires me: according to the
yin yang philosophy, along with light, there is always darkness. So are entrepreneurial
strategies in developing countries!
REFERENCES:
Kornai, J. 1992. The Socialist System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sorensen, J. B. 2007. "Bureaucracy and entrepreneurship," Administrative Science
Quarterly, 52: 387-412.
Chapter One
EVALUATION OR ATTENTION: HOW DO SOCIAL TIES
MATTER IN VENTURE FINANCING?
This paper advances our understanding of why entrepreneurs with social ties to
venture capital (VC) firms are more likely to be awarded VC financing. Prior research
tends to argue that embeddedness in social relationships alleviates the concerns of
adverse selection and moral hazard in economic transactions, thus entrepreneurs with
social ties to investors are more likely to gain VC financing. However, the availability of
alternative mechanisms for VCs to collect information and to monitor startup behavior,
plus the often limited capability of referrers in judging the quality of startup ventures
(information misalignment) and potential conflict of interest between referrers and
investors (incentive misalignment) should limit the role of social ties in VC decision-
making. Why then do we see positive correlation between social ties and venture
financing? This paper argues that past studies focus mainly on the final outcome of
venture financing and thus conflate investors' decision-making about which
entrepreneurial ventures to fund with the necessary preceding act of becoming aware of
them. I propose a two-stage model of VC decision-making, where entrepreneurs have to
first receive VC interview offers before being evaluated for funding selection. Using a
dataset collected through fieldwork involving 72 startups in two Chinese science parks, I
find that better networked entrepreneurs have an advantage in getting the initial attention
of investors, but this advantage does not carry over to the next stage of evaluation.
Collapsing the two stages together can give misleading conclusions about the role of
social networks.
INTRODUCTION
Social networks seem to play a crucial role in the world of entrepreneurship.
Startup firms generally have little legitimacy and few of the resources needed for survival
and growth (Stinchcombe 1965; Aldrich and Auster 1986; Freeman, 1997). To overcome
these constraints, entrepreneurs often draw upon their "social capital." A large literature
has found entrepreneurs with social ties to decision-makers are more successful in
achieving desirable economic ends such as bank loans (Uzzi 1999; Mizruchi and Steams
2001), innovative capability (Stuart 1998; Ahuja 2000; Burt 2004), and organizational
longevity (Baum and Oliver, 1991). Summarizing the literature, Stuart and Sorenson
(2005:233) conclude, "If one thinks of ideas, knowledge, and capital as the central
ingredients entrepreneurs must assemble in new venture creation, social relations provide
the connections required to unite these ingredients to form new organizations."
At first glance, this summary statement seems to capture the important role that
networks play in securing venture capital (henceforth, VC) financing. In a study of 134
high tech firms, Stuart and Shane (2002) find that new ventures are most likely to be
funded when their founders have direct or indirect ties with the VC community. Similar
results have been replicated in many different settings (Shane and Cable 2002; Hsu 2007;
Hallen 2008), including transition economies (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003). In their study
of the investment decisions of 40 Chinese venture capitalists, Batjargal and Liu (2004)
find that these Chinese investors not only prefer to invest in firms owned by their friends,
but also tend to approve them for higher levels of funding.
The natural question to ask is why venture capitalists (VCs) might favor firms to
which they have social ties. Prior literature has focused mainly on the issue of evaluation,
arguing that social embeddedness helps solve the problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard in economic exchanges. On the one hand, network ties facilitate
information exchange between entrepreneurs and investors (Podolny 2001; Shane and
Cable 2002), giving them a better way of combining resources for new value creation
than through arm's length transactions (Podolny and Page 1998; Uzzi 1999; Uzzi and
Lancaster 2003). On the other hand, network ties may serve as a control mechanism
(Coleman 1988; DiMaggio and Louch 1998), helping investors monitor entrepreneurs'
behavior and mobilize the VC community to prevent and punish opportunistic behavior
(Stuart and Sorenson 2005). From these perspectives, a given venture would be evaluated
much more positively by investors with whom the entrepreneur has prior social ties than
by those with whom she lacks ties.
While these arguments seem compelling, there are good reasons to doubt network
effects in evaluation. Although resource holders are expected to favor entrepreneurs to
whom they are connected when social ties are the only source of reliable information
(Rangan 2000; Rona-Tas and Guseva 2001), it is unclear why they should favor social
ties when alternative mechanisms can serve the same purpose (Zuckerman 2008). The
VC industry has developed various measures to let investors assess the quality of
entrepreneurs and the promise of their business ventures (Sahlman, 1990). Though
imperfect, mechanisms such as due diligence, vesting and board membership do create
opportunities for investors to interact with entrepreneurs closely and help align the
interests of the two parties (Lerner and Gomper, 1999; Baum and Silverman, 2004).
These mechanisms are not perfect, but neither is reliance on prior connections
(Granovetter 1985: 491; Fernandez et al. 2000; Sorenson and Waguespack 2006).' The
important issue is that as long as the alternative mechanisms function reasonably well, the
role of social ties at evaluation should be limited (Kuwabara 2007; Robinson and Stuart
2007; Zuckerman 2008).2
If social ties do not play a salient role in evaluation, why has the prior literature
consistently shown a strong and positive relationship between social ties and venture
financing? This paper proposes an alternative theory of network effects in venture
financing, arguing that the apparent preference for entrepreneurs with social ties to the
VC firm is an artifact of the multi-stage nature of funding decisions. Specifically, I argue
that VC financing is a two-stage selection process, of which evaluation is the last stage
(see Figure 1), preceded by an awareness stage. By focusing on the final outcome, past
research ignores the earlier stage and the potential network effects there. This raises the
possibility that the benefits of ties found at evaluation could be an artifact of collapsing
the stages of the process.
Responding to the call for "more process-oriented" research in the network
literature (Powell and Smith-Doerr 2005), I develop a multi-stage view of network effects.
As decision-making generally takes place in a sequence of action and deliberation (Simon
1955; Coleman et al. 1966), it is important to reveal the black box of decision-making in
order to understand how economic exchanges are embedded in social relationships (Van
den Bulte and Lilien 2004; Sorenson and Waguespack 2006). By making a clear
distinction between the awareness generation (i.e., constructing the set of options to be
considered for evaluation) and efficiency evaluation (i.e., evaluating the consideration set
to select the most efficient options) stages of the decision-making process, this study
helps further our understanding of when and how social ties matter in economic
exchanges. Specifically, I argue that network ties help entrepreneurs make VCs aware of
opportunities to invest in their firms; however, once they are in the consideration set,
entrepreneurs do not necessarily benefit from social connections in terms of how they are
evaluated.
To explain the varying role of social ties across the two stages, I look at the VC
decision-making environment and the content and structural features of networks that
connect VCs and entrepreneurs. I argue that information embedded in social ties helps
reduce investors' search costs but is a relatively secondary consideration when it comes
time to make a decision with financial implications. In the deal origination (or awareness)
stage, VCs are faced with a large number of options and a relative lack of time for
intensive due diligence; hence, there is scope for social networks to appreciably and
systematically influence how investors construct their consideration sets. By contrast, the
information value of social ties is reduced in the evaluation stage because of limitations
on referrers' knowledge (e.g. many individuals connected with VCs are laypersons who
lack the business knowledge to help VCs judge investment opportunities), their potential
conflicts of interest (e.g. referrers are often friends with the entrepreneurs they refer, or
the latter has promised a commission fee), and the availability of alternative mechanisms
(for investors to evaluate and monitor entrepreneurs).
This paper develops and tests the two-stage model by analyzing China's VC
market. As a developing country with weak market-supporting institutions, China makes
a good setting for such research. A large body of literature has found that in an
environment where formal institutions such as laws and regulations are weak, firms have
to perform such basic functions as obtaining market information, interpreting regulations,
and enforcing contracts through informal means (Keister 2001; Peng, 2004; Rona-Tas
and Guseva, 2001). This makes relationships "absolutely essential to successfully
complete any task in virtually all spheres of social (and economic) life" (Gold et al.
2002:3; see also, Zhou et al. 2003; Gerber and Mayorova 2008) 3. Thus, China serves as a
conservative test for my argument that networks may not play a salient role in venture
evaluation: If I do not find that social ties help entrepreneurs gain favorable evaluations
from VC in China, where institutions are weak and social ties should matter, it is unlikely
social ties would generate such advantages in the U.S., where institutions are strong and
ties matter less.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on
the role of networks in economic transactions and integrates it with in-depth field
research to develop a multi-stage model of VC financing. Because qualitative research
can overstate theoretical processes, I complement the field research with a quantitative
study of 72 startup firms that reported 358 requests for VC financing. Section III
describes the empirical setting and data, and Section IV presents the empirical analysis. I
use a variety of empirical methods to test the theory, in order to ensure the robustness of
the statistical results. The findings from within-entrepreneur fixed-effect conditional
logistic regression provide rare evidence of an association between social ties and
interview granting, independent of entrepreneurs' individual characteristics. The last
section of the paper discusses the empirical results and compares them with findings in
the labor market and innovation adoption literatures to draw some general conclusions
regarding how social relationships may enter into decision-making across contexts.
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING
The prevalence of using social ties in the quest for economic benefit seems to
confirm the old saying that, "It is not what you know, but who you know that matters!"
Many studies have found that actors with social ties to decision-makers are more likely to
obtain desirable ends such as job mobility (Granovetter 1973; Bian 1997; Burt 1997),
financial resources (Uzzi 2002; Gulati and Higgins 2003), and business contracts (Larson
1992; Zhou et al. 2003). These studies gradually shifted the characterization of economic
exchanges from anonymity to familiarity (Zuckerman 2008), and revealed that social
relationships are an important determinant of the creation and maintenance of economic
advantages (Sorensen 1996; Lin 1999).
As the notion that social ties create privileged access to key resources gained
increasing acceptance, the focus of research shifted towards studying the mechanisms
through which social ties yield benefits. An emerging theme in several literatures is that
decision-making is a sequence of actions and deliberation and that the influence of
networks is contingent on the stage of the decision-making process (Fernandez and
Weinberg, 1997; Mizruchi and Steams, 2001; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2004;
Zuckerman, 2008). This line of argument can be traced back to Coleman et al.'s (1966:
58) classic study Medical Innovation, which argued that factors "enter into the making of
a decision" with a "characteristic time-order" that "correspond[s] to a sequence of stages
in the cognitive process of decision-making itself." The authors further suggest,
"relatively more formal sources of influence - particularly the impersonal mass media,
but also the personal agent of interested company - may bring word of what's new ...
this is followed, prior to actual adoption of the innovation, by rather extensive checking
with other sources, and particularly with the informal-personal sources of information."
Van den Bulte and Lilien (2004) recently picked up the idea and showed that
distinguishing between the two stages of awareness (i.e., interest generation for
consideration) and evaluation (e.g. efficiency assessment for selection) has important
implications. Re-analyzing the Medical Innovation data, the authors find that a one-stage
model would show no evidence that social ties matter among doctors in new drug
diffusion (Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2001; 2004). In contrast, a two-stage model
demonstrates that network ties do influence the evaluation and thus the eventual adoption
of new drug, even though doctors mainly learned of its availability through impersonal
mass media (Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2004). An application to the adoption of ATMs
by US banks further illustrates that collapsing the two stages of awareness and evaluation
may give misleading conclusions about how network ties enter into decision-making. In a
similar fashion, Fernandez and Sosa's (2005) study of labor market segregation shows
that, while gender homophily of networks affects job application (an awareness stage),
that effect would be concealed if a study focused solely on the employer's final choice
(evaluation).
The two-stage model can apply to many decision contexts, including VC
financing. The large number of funding requests that VCs receive, plus the complexity of
evaluating them, makes VC financing a situation where decision-makers have to divide
the decision into relatively simple and structured stages (Newell and Simon, 1972;
Mintzberg et al., 1976). Like doctors and employers, venture capitalists rarely evaluate all
the options available or even all that they are aware of. It is not atypical for a VC firm to
screen out 90% of business plans received before reviewing the rest through due
diligence for funding consideration (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Given the number of
submitted business plans that fail to make it into consideration for VC financing,
breaking down the decision-making into stages helps illustrate the possibility that the
observed network effect really operates in the awareness stage rather than the evaluation
stage.
MULTI-STAGE MODEL OF NETWORK EFFECTS IN VENTURE FINANCING
Although prior research has found a positive relationship between entrepreneurs'
ties with investors and their access to VC funding, both empirical and theoretical reasons
lead to the suspicion that networks have a limited effect on how startups are evaluated but
instead play a role in bringing them to VCs' awareness. Empirically, all prior research
has had information only on the outcome of funding decisions. Therefore, these studies
have had to infer the effect of social ties by comparing the networks entrepreneurs who
received VC financing and those who did not. Such an approach implicitly assumes that
networks influence VCs' evaluation of all firms, regardless of whether they have actually
passed the awareness stage of the VC decision-making process and entered the
consideration set for selection. Consequently, this line of research cannot distinguish
between the following three scenarios: 1) networks help entrepreneurs mainly during the
first, or awareness-generation, stage; 2) networks help entrepreneurs mainly during the
second, or evaluation, stage; or 3) networks help entrepreneurs at both stages. A data set
that makes an explicit distinction between the two stages should help unpack the causal
mechanism to help explain where the advantages of entrepreneurs with social ties to VC
arise.
Key theoretical reasons bolster the doubt raised by the empirical gap that VCs
would rely heavily on information from mutual ties in evaluating new ventures. First,
heterogeneity of the referral network can make the referral process "clunky" (Obukhova,
2008). Although VCs receive recommendations from other investors and seasoned
entrepreneurs (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Roberts, 1991:196-197), they also receive many
referrals from laypersons such as neighbors, family friends, and other people with whom
they share non-professional ties. Unlike investors or seasoned entrepreneurs, these
individuals often lack the professional knowledge to help VCs make intelligent
judgments regarding investment opportunities. Given the high market and technological
uncertainty in the industries in which VCs operate, the identification and recognition of
feasible ventures often requires a long learning curve that is beyond most people's reach.4
Even though mutual friends are motivated to connect entrepreneurs with investors, their
referrals may result in "blind dating" that does not match the two parties' skills, assets,
and objectives. After bringing entrepreneurs and investors together, referrers usually
leave them alone and let them figure out the rest. From this perspective, social referrals
help entrepreneurs and investors search at the "extensive" margin (Rees 1966), but not
necessarily at the "intensive" margin (Fernandez et al. 2000).
Chinese investors are very much aware of the potential pitfalls of over-reliance on
social ties for venture evaluation. They were often straightforward about their concerns,
as a general partner from a renowned Beijing VC firm said:
"You have to be careful (about the reliability of information sources). You pay
close attention to the recommendations of people whom you know mean business.
Unfortunately, that's not always the case. When it is your Aunt No. 7 or Uncle No. 8, you
listen but have to make your own judgment. You will be surprised to see how far off the
mark some referred business plans are! In certain cases, if they [the referrers] have some
business sense or know a bit of the technology, they might feel embarrassed."5
Second, even when referrers have private information on the quality of the
investment opportunities or the expertise to distinguish sound projects from bad ones,
venture capitalists may still have reservations regarding how much to rely on their
information or judgment in making the final investment decision. As entrepreneurs are
often personal friends of the referrers or may promise (in many cases, explicitly) a
commission fee, the latter may communicate a biased view to investors regarding the
quality of the entrepreneurs and their business opportunities. In the context of job markets,
Fernandez et al. (2000:1333) find that human resource managers are highly skeptical
about the motivation of employee referrers. As one manager said, "You would think that
people would not refer just anybody since it would reflect on them if the person were not
any good. But the other side of this is that I know people who would refer their dog if
they can get a $250 bonus." Given the friendship and/or financial stakes involved, we
have no reason to expect that people who refer entrepreneurs for VC consideration would
behave much better.
Chinese investors are well aware of the potential conflicts of interest in business
dealing through social networks. They worry that referrers are tempted to convey a one-
sided message rather than a comprehensive view. As one Beijing investor from a Silicon
Valley-based firm said, "How often do we give a person a negative referral? You can
play down the [negative] issues. You do not bad-mouth someone in your circle. That
simply does not seem right. After all, this is a small world."
The promise of a potentially handsome commission fee from the entrepreneur can
further compromise the incentive for referrers to convey objective information: "Often
people get a commission fee of 1 to 3 percent (of the investment VC makes into a firm).
That's A LOT of money! As the old saying goes, 'with money you can get the ghost to
turn the millstone!'"
This does not mean that these investors are hyper-suspicious, but the high stakes
involved do push them to seek means beyond personal trust to protect their interests. As
one entrepreneur-turned-venture-capitalist said, "Trust is everything in China! The
problem is how [to achieve it]. ... People have different motivations. When the stakes are
high, temptation is also high. ... You want to trust people, but you also need proof of
their trustworthiness and the tools to protect yourself. ... I have seen enough cases where
good personal relationships turned sour due to the conflict of interests. ... Business is
about people. However, you cannot take it too personally."
The investor went on to recall the lesson he drew as an entrepreneur from a
former friend:
"I was in Japan but wanted to find a Chinese design firm (for a particular product).
HG had a team of researchers working in a related area. I knew he was quite capable, as
we were college classmates. So when he said that his team could do the design, I gave
them the job. I asked my wife to transfer 5 million yuan directly to his firm without much
investigation [of their design capability]. I trusted them. I waited for half a year for them
to deliver the prototype. After several rounds of failed promises, I flew here (e.g. Beijing)
and found that they did not have the capability to design the product at all!"
This echoes many scholars' concerns about the dark side of embedded economic
exchanges (Granovetter 1985; Portes and Patricia Landolt 1996; Gargiulo 2006). It is
difficult to know "from ex ante whether and to what extent personal ties can cement trust
between economic actors" (Nee and Ingram 1998:22). As Granovetter (1985) concedes
and even emphasizes, only those you trust are in a position to embezzle from you. It is
well known that the risk of malfeasance and opportunism increases as the stakes involved
in an exchange increase. The axiom "never lend money to a friend" stems from
experiences on the flip side of the personal-relations-as-the-source-of-trust coin (Nee and
Ingram 1998).
Even if social ties provide information about entrepreneurs and such
information is reliable, the information may not necessarily give entrepreneurs with
social ties to VC an advantage in receiving VC financing. When networks convey
complete information about an entrepreneur, investors will learn his weaknesses as well
as his strengths. Unless investors are averse to uncertainty, 6 or referred startups are also
of higher quality, more information may not make investors more likely to fund
entrepreneurs with whom they share ties. Since venture capitalists generally invest in
high-tech businesses that operate in an environment of high uncertainty (Gomper and
Lerner, 1999), the assumption that investors are averse to uncertainty is hardly tenable. If
referred firms are of higher quality than those that submit their proposals without referral,
one has to ask to what extent social connections have independent effects on funding
decisions. Theories and research on group dynamics have long suggested that network
ties are not formed randomly (McPherson et al. 2001), and that firms with limited
resources are less attractive to potential partners (Podolny 1994; Hsu 2004; Siegel 2007).
We may expect that high-capability entrepreneurs are both more likely to form ties with
VCs and to receive their funding, rendering the perceived relationship between networks
and positive economic outcomes spurious.
We also have reason to suspect that VC may not rely on the existence of mutual
ties with entrepreneurs to ensure contract enforcement. Alternative mechanisms could be
equally effective in ameliorating the risk of opportunistic behavior (Gompers and Lerner,
2002; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). For instance, rather than allocating an investment in
a lump sum, VCs can make the investment in installments. Supplying entrepreneurs with
additional funds only when they have reached designated milestones helps induce their
effort, extend the "shadow of the future," and align the interests of the transacting parties.
They can also use vesting to create a positive incentive: entrepreneurs, if they reach
designated milestones, will receive more equity shares and thus higher payoffs. Board
memberships provide further opportunities for investors to monitor entrepreneurs'
behavior closely and to exercise the power to reshape the management team if necessary
(Wasserman 2003). Furthermore, the VC community is relatively small, and many firms
are intricately linked with one another. Entrepreneurs that intend to victimize one VC
have to consider the possibility of collective sanction from the whole VC community,
since news of their malfeasance would be quickly circulated in the VC community, which
would cost the entrepreneurs future funding opportunities.7
Due to the heterogeneity of the referral network and the potential for conflicts of
interest, VCs have a strong incentive to use other sources to double-check the reliability
of the information they received through referrals. Thus, we should expect the following
hypothesis:
H : Once in the evaluation stage, an entrepreneur's chance of receiving financing
from venture capital firms is not influenced by the existence of ties between the
two parties.
Social Ties and Awareness Generation
Returning to the awareness stage, one important yet rarely explored theme in the
prior literature is that social relationships shape an entrepreneur's chances of getting onto
investors' radar screens. Stuart and Sorenson (2005:238) have suggested that
entrepreneurs with social ties to VC are better positioned to make potential investors
aware of the opportunity to invest in their firms, arguing that "much as entrepreneurs
recognize opportunities by aggregating information available in their networks, investors
identify promising investment candidates in part by searching across their networks.
Better-connected founders therefore more likely reach the attention of investors looking
for options." Theory and research on decision-making have long pointed out that actors
rarely evaluate all the options that are available or even all that they are aware of (Simon,
1955; Alba, Hutchinson and Lynch, 1999). As the set of alternatives actually considered
can be much smaller than the set available, the filtering effect can be substantial (Simon,
1955; March and Simon, 1958; Van den Bulte and Lilien, 2004:9). Given the number of
business plans that fail to gain VCs' attention, it is surprising that the venture financing
literature has rarely explored how social ties shape the way that investors determine
which firms make it into the consideration set for evaluation.
An important insight regarding consideration sets is that they are also the result
of satisficing behaviors rather than optimizing behaviors, particularly in complex
situations where the search for best candidates requires efforts that are beyond an actor's
cognitive capability (Simon, 1955; March and Simon, 1958; Payne, 1976). Given the
number of funding requests they receive and the limited time they may spend screening
them, venture capitalists are likely to use the shortcut of relying on the information
conveyed through social ties to infer the quality of a proposal (Fried and Hisrich 1994;
Shane and Cable 2002; Stuart and Sorenson 2005). They may even interpret the
information channeled through networks more positively and give entrepreneurs with
whom they have social ties the benefit of the doubt (Sorenson and Waguespack 2006;
Zajonc 1968). As Rangoon (2000:813) suggests, "when actors need to but cannot,
independently or via market mechanisms, cost-effectively ascertain the identity and
reliability of potential exchange partners, then scope exists for social networks to
appreciably and systematically influence efficiency." Searches conducted through social
networks tend to be cheap and expeditious, because information can be acquired "by use
of social relationships that are maintained for other purposes" (Coleman, 1988:104).
Information conveyed through social ties thus most easily satisfies venture capitalists'
relatively low information requirements in the attention stage (i.e., deal screening). As
one entrepreneur-turned-investor put it:
"I cannot emphasize enough how important personal relationships are in this
business. Guanxi [the Chinese word for social ties] opens doors. The more people you
know in a meaningful way, among people who are involved in company-building, the
more likely you will get the opportunity to talk about your venture. ... I graduated from
Tsinghua University and had experience with startups in California. Naturally I am
connected with a large community of entrepreneurs and investors of top caliber."
A second investor was more explicit about the informational role of social ties:
"You can pick up the phone and make some calls. ... You know each other well
and [the referrer] has to answer your questions. This is a quick way for you to get some
information about the firm, particularly on the management team. It often takes time for
you to dig out the information independently. Our firm receives between 30 and 70
business proposals each week. Both the most and least promising ones are easy calls.
However, the majority fall in a gray area. Extra information that is trustworthy definitely
makes a difference in our decision of whom to invite [for presentation]."
Some VCs went further and argued that social referral itself might serve as a
screening mechanism:
"One thing I can say is that firms referred by friends generally are not too bad,
particularly when the referrers themselves are businessmen or investors. ... The quality
of deals we receive [through other channels] varies dramatically. In some cases you don't
even want to read the business proposal after the first glance. ... However, it is very rare
to receive bad deals through referral. When people care about their reputations, they do
not want to leave a bad taste in a friend's mouth. That's no good!"
During the awareness stage, entrepreneurs with social ties to VC may have
further advantages unrelated to the information that social ties convey or facilitate.
Investors with strong ties to entrepreneurs approaching them for funding may often feel
that they have no choice but to treat them favorably. When a friend recommends a deal,
the investor's active response, such as scheduling an interview, would be interpreted as
reciprocity for the referrer's goodwill and would bolster the referrer's reputation among
investors and entrepreneurs. In contrast, inaction would be interpreted as lack of respect
for the friend, which would damage the referrer's reputation and lead to a rupture of the
social tie between referrer and investor. Since it is relatively cheap for VCs to expand
their consideration sets, on the margin they might include proposals in which the referral
conveys little information, but carries high social costs for inaction. The granting of
interviews, from this perspective, serves as a payment of courtesy and a show of respect
for the referrer and maintains the social tie between referrer and investor, but should not
carry over to have an effect on evaluation. One well-respected entrepreneur-turned-VC-
investor told me a story about an entrepreneur whom he interviewed, although he knew
from the start that he would not invest in the firm:
"... I made my fortune in this industry back in California and know it inside
out. His firm had no chance to deliver the type of return I would expect [as an investor].
Do not get me wrong. It is solid business and he can make good money. I have no doubt
about it ..... Director M [of one of the most renowned science parks in China] made the
introduction. For me, that made it a 'political task' and there was no choice [but to
interview the entrepreneur]. ... You give people credit for their good intentions [in
referring deals]."8
Similarly, another investor explained,
"We live in a guanxi society. Whether in business dealings or in daily life, it is
better to give people some mianzi [i.e., preserve each other's face and show respect].
When I first came back from the U.S., I felt strongly against the practice of renqing [the
exchange of social favors] as it seemed to be such a waste of time. However, conducting
business only on business terms does not work. When you only put up the business face,
people think you are cold-hearted and calculating. It would create distance, and not many
people would speak their hearts to you. You have to walk a fine line, and this is not a
trivial issue. ... It is hard to say 'No' to people whom you know well. It's a delicate
art."9
Combining theoretical arguments with the field research about the effects of
social ties on VC interview granting suggests the following hypothesis:
H2: Startups are more likely to receive interview offers from VCs with which
they have social ties than from VCs to which they are not connected.
DATA AND SETTING
This paper uses China as a strategic site to examine how social relationships enter
into a VC's decision-making processes. There are several reasons that China serves as a
good research setting. First, Chinese society is well known for its emphasis on
interpersonal relationships in guiding economic and social organizations (Fried 1969;
Hwang 1987; Walder 1986). Although managers all over the world devote a considerable
amount of time and energy to social networking (Mintzberg 1973), Chinese managers
perhaps "rely more heavily on the cultivation of personal relationships to deal with the
exigencies of their situation" (Child 1994: 150; see also Peng and Luo 2000) than
managers in other cultures. The reliance on social relations is seen as so fundamental that
some scholars argue the Chinese economy is essentially "network capitalism" (Boisot
and Child 1996; Hamilton 1989)10. Second, China is a developing country where many
market-supporting institutions are weak. To overcome institutional voids, firms often
adopt informal means and draw upon social relationships to identify reliable transacting
partners (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001), ensure contract compliance(Zhou et al., 2003),
and foster governmental accountability (Peng, 2004; Tsai, 2007). Even though economic
transactions are generally embedded in social relationships (Macaulay, 1963; Granovetter,
1985), networks play a particularly large role in the developing country context (Child,
1994; McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). From this perspective, China is an ideal place to
investigate the role of networks and thus it is a conservative research laboratory for
examining the limited role of social relationships in venture financing. If social ties do
not play a salient role in a guanxi-based society like China, we should not expect them to
play a salient role in the West, as the latter has a more individual-oriented value system
as well as better developed market-supporting institutions.
The data are the result of five months of fieldwork in early 2008, during which I
conducted more than 140 interviews, including meetings with approximately 110 startup
firms, 15 venture capitalists, eight governmental officials, and six science park managers.
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and three hours, with most being about 90
minutes. The interview questions focused on the founder's individual background and the
startup's path of development.
A key founder of each startup also answered a questionnaire that solicited detailed
information about the founder's educational background, career history, entrepreneurial
experience, business partners, relationships with VCs, and the outcome of the funding
request(s) for each VC they approached.
One unique feature of the dataset is that it distinguishes between the various
stages through which entrepreneurNC interactions take place, making it possible to
identify where the advantages for connected entrepreneurs arise. The data also include
multiple observations for startup/VC interaction over the same entrepreneur, allowing me
to run entrepreneur-level fixed-effects analysis whenever possible to rule out hypotheses
based on individual capability.
I chose to study internet and telecom ventures. During the past decade, these are
the two high-tech sectors that have attracted the most Chinese VC investments (Zeng,
2004: vi; Li, 2005). The firms in the research sample are mainly located in two university
science parks (USPs). These parks were established with the mission of accelerating
business through technology commercialization, knowledge agglomeration and resource
sharing. China built its first USP in 1991 and now has about 100. The two parks at which
I conducted interviews are classified as National University Science Parks due to the
sponsoring institutions' technological capacity and their success in promoting high tech
firms. These two parks have gradually grown into magnets for firms that want to access
local talent and technological assets, and have attracted enormous attention from venture
capital firms that seek investment opportunities in high tech startups. Thus, these USPs
present a high concentration of high tech startups that have VC financing, making them
an ideal setting for fieldwork on VC financing in China. The USPs also keep
comprehensive information on the firms they host, enabling researchers to define the
boundary of the target population and making it easy to sample relevant firms.
To avoid drawing conclusions that are idiosyncratically bound to one geographic
area, local culture or institutional environment, I chose one park in Beijing, in northern
China, and another in Guangzhou, in southern China. While Guangzhou is renowned for
its export-oriented manufacturing industries (Vogel 1989), Beijing is more famous for
leading China's leap into the information age (Lu 2000; Siegel 2002). The Beijing USP I
studied has grown into a high-tech hub in Asia. Along with startup firms, it also hosts
research centers for a number of multinational companies. There are around 160 internet
and telecom ventures in the Beijing USP, and I selected every third one from an
alphabetical list of their incorporated names for interviews. Unsurprisingly, the
Guangzhou park is much smaller; there, I selected all 36 internet and telecom firms for
interviews. I approached these firms through the referrals of USP managers, venture
capitalists, and journalists who report on high-tech ventures, and these referrals ensured
that I succeeded in interviewing most of the entrepreneurs that were selected'1
Excluding firms that have never sought VC financing (four firms) and firms that
refused to reveal any financial information (two firms) or information regarding how they
interacted with VCs (three firms), I obtained a sample of 72 firms. The unit of analysis in
this paper is entrepreneur/VC dyad. For each of the VC firms that a startup approached, I
created a VC/entrepreneur pair to capture the process of their interaction. In total, there
are 358 VC/entrepreneur dyads. My survey gathered detailed information about the
following variables:
Dependent Variables
Funding Offer. In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, a dummy variable
is created to capture whether an entrepreneur received a funding offer from a particular
VC that she approached. In total, there are 53 VC funding offers for 17 firms. 12 The
proportion of firms receiving VC financing is high due to the concentration of high
quality firms in the USPs and the VCs' interest in the industrial sectors that I am studying.
Interview Offers. Funding offers only measure the final outcome of
VC/entrepreneur interactions. To capture the dynamic nature of this process, I create a
dummy variable at the startup/VC pair level to measure whether an entrepreneur receives
an interview offer from a particular VC firm that he has approached. In particular, I use
the invitation by a VC to give a PowerPoint presentation as an indicator that the
entrepreneur has received a serious interview offer. This is the first formal meeting
between the two parties, and it gives the startup the opportunity to demonstrate its
business model, its market opportunity and the founding team's capacity to the investor.
Therefore, it can be perceived as a watershed event that shows a VC's interest in the firm.
Out of the 358 VC/entrepreneur pairs, 195 interview offers were extended to 58
startups.
The distinction between interview and funding offers captures the multi-stage
nature of VC/entrepreneur interactions, allowing me to test the descriptive fit of the three
scenarios listed above and uncover where the advantages of connected entrepreneurs
arise (in the awareness stage, the evaluation stage, or both), and to explore whether
collapsing the two stages into one may give misleading conclusions regarding the role of
social ties in VCs' evaluation of startups.
Explanatory Variables
This study's key explanatory variable is the entrepreneur's primary method of
soliciting VC financing. For each of the VCs that a startup firm approached, the founder
was asked the following question: "What is the primary method that you used to build
contacts with the VC firm?" The possible responses were as follows:
1. We were friends
2. We were introduced by mutual friends
3. We were acquaintances
4. We were introduced by mutual acquaintances
5. We met at a conference/other business occasion
6. I submitted a business plan
7. Other
These seven responses were further combined into three categories: 1) direct ties
(responses 1 and 3); 2) indirect ties (responses 2 and 4) and 3) others (responses 5, 6 and
7). I explicitly instructed the entrepreneurs to answer this question regarding the
relationship with the VC at the time contact was initiated, rather than at the time of the
interview. Of the 358 cases of deal origination in the sample, 15% were initiated through
direct network ties and 41% through social referrals. 13
Control Variables
To provide more accurate estimates of the hypothesized relationships, I control
other factors that previous research has found to be important in explaining startups'
receipt of venture financing. First, I collected information on the amount of capital the
founding team invested in the startup's first year of existence. Given the information
asymmetry between VCs and entrepreneurs that favors the latter (Cable and Shane, 1997),
outside investors consider the amount of capital the founders invest a sign of their
confidence regarding the venture's promise. Additionally, firms with larger resource
endowments are more likely to progress quickly through the development process
(Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Hallen, 2008; Shane and Stuart, 2002).14 Second, I collected
information on the entrepreneur's work history. Past studies have suggested that
individuals' risk preferences (Gomper et al 2005; Sorensen, 2007) and network
opportunities (Burton et al. 2002; Hallen, 2008) are greatly shaped by their career paths
and that new ventures inherit both routines (Philips, 2002) and cultures from the founders'
previously affiliated organizations. I construct a dummy variable called "Hi-profile
Career" to measure whether the entrepreneur had worked as a middle- or higher-level
manager in one of most famous Chinese startups (those that have been listed either on the
New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ). These firms include Sohu.com, Baidu.com,
Sina.com, Netease.com and AsiaInfo. [Only these?] We should expect that these
entrepreneurs have built a career track record that will attract both high-capability
employees and outside investors. Third, to capture the entrepreneurs' human capital, I
collected information on their educational background (i.e., the highest degree received)
and leadership skills (i.e., if the entrepreneur was a student leader in college). Although
the literature suggests that leadership experience helps prepare individuals to exploit
entrepreneurial opportunities (Lazaer 2002), there is no consensus regarding the role of
formal and advanced education (Roberts 1991). A large share (53 out of 72) of the
entrepreneurs in my sample had obtained master-level degrees. Thus, I use a dummy
variable to distinguish whether the entrepreneur had received a doctoral degree or not.
I also collected information on each startup's establishment year and the industrial
sector in which it operates. Prior research has shown that firms that have overcome the
"liability of newness" are not only likely to survive longer (Freeman et al. 1984; Aldrich
and Foil 1994) but also more likely to have a performance record that attracts investors'
attention (Hallen 2008). Studies also suggest that venture capitalists favor certain
industries for early stage investments (Haar et al. 1988; Shane and Cable 2002). Thus, I
created a variable ("year established") to measure the year in which the firm was
established and two dummy variables ("telecom" and "e-Commerce") to capture its
industry.
Furthermore, I collected the names of the VCs approached by entrepreneurs in my
sample. Given that VCs vary in their expertise and industrial focuses, the same business
venture can be evaluated differently across investors. To capture this dimension of the
story, I created an ordinal variable, based on information from the consulting firm
Zero2IPO, to rank the prestige of these VC firms. 15 Past research has shown that startups
are particularly interested in investments from high-status VCs, because these VCs are
better positioned to certify a startup's quality (Stuart et al., 1999; Hsu, 2004), to help
build collaborative alliances (Hsu, 2006) and to help with an initial public offering (Stuart
et al., 1999)16.
Last but not least important, I have built a variable to capture the number of
interview requests that each VC receives. VC firms typically have a small staff but
receive a large number of business proposals. To ensure the quality of their due diligence,
VCs typically interview a limited number of entrepreneurs, based on the time constraints
of the general partners, and regardless of the number of funding requests received. Thus,
the higher the number of requests a VC firm receives, the lower the likelihood that any
one proposal will get to the evaluation stage. The number of firms in the evaluation stage,
in contrast, is relatively fixed, so a firm's chance of being selected for funding from this
group should not vary with the original number of funding requests, as VCs tend to make
funding decisions based on whether a firm meets evaluation criteria such as the projected
internal rate of return (Fried and Hirsch 1994).
METHODS
This study uses several methods to explore the relationship between social ties
and venture financing at the entrepreneur/VC pair level. I begin with a descriptive
analysis of the proportion of funding offers that were obtained using each of the three
approaches (direct ties, indirect ties, and other). I then use logit regression models to
estimate the effect of VC ties upon an entrepreneur's likelihood of receiving funding
offers". In doing so, I examine the robustness of the conclusions to be drawn from
alternative conceptual models: one that distinguishes between the awareness (equation 1,
below) and evaluation stages (equation 2), and another that collapses the two into a single
VC decision process (equation 3).
Two-stage model of social networks:
Pr (Interview Offersij=l) = F(a1 + P3 Tiesij + ZBIZ + Jij) (1)
Pr (Funding Offersi I Interview Offersij = 1) = F (a2 + 12 Tiesi + 1B 2Z + pij) (2)
One-stage model of social networks:
Pr (Funding Offersij =1)= F (a3 + 33 Tiesij + ZB 3Z + Rij) (3)
where, ij represents the entrepreneur i / VC firm j pair;
Tiesij measures the (lack of) social ties between entrepreneur i and VC firm j;
Z is a vector of control variables that captures VC, entrepreneur, or startup-
level characteristics;
a, 0 and B are the coefficients for the constant term, social ties and control
variables;
t is the error term.
This paper has two main arguments: first, social ties matter most during the
awareness, or interview offer, stage, but their role diminishes during the evaluation, or
funding offer, stage; and second, collapsing the two stages together boosts the apparent
importance of social ties in VC financing decisions. Thus, the key predictions of this
paper are as follows: 1) 13 is positive and statistically significant; 2) 12 is of no statistical
significance and is substantively smaller than 1; and 3) 33 is positive and statistically
significant, and substantially larger than 2.
In contrast, prior research suggests that network ties help startups gain positive
evaluations and, consequently, a higher likelihood of funding offers. Thus, prior research
also predicts that 33 is positive and significant, but makes no prediction about P1 & P2. In
this sense, prior theory is a subset of the theory I propose.
Given that the theoretical framework proposes that there is a selection
mechanism involved during the awareness stage, a selection model is a conceptually
appropriate method for estimating the effect of social ties on venture financing. By
running two separate regressions for the attention and evaluation stages, this paper
observes the funding result only for the startup/VC pairs where the entrepreneur is
selected for an interview. This may generate biased estimators, as the two stages can be
interdependent on each other, in the sense that firms are less likely to receive interviews
when VCs perceive them as unworthy of funding. The advantage of the selection model
is that it accounts for the counterfactual that some firms might have been selected for
funding evaluation if they had had social connections with the investors, but instead they
were not granted interviews because they lacked such ties. To correct this selection bias, I
use a bivariate probit model for two outcomes (namely, interview offer and funding offer),
where the observed funding data are non-randomly selected from the set of
VC/entrepreneur pairs in which funding requests are made'". The model is
zij,I = P'Xij,1+ Eij,l , yij,l = sgn(zij,,),
Zij,2 = 'Xij,2+ Eij,2, yij,2 = sgn(zij,2),
Eij,1, Eij,2- BVN(0,0,1,1, p),
(yij,2, xij,2) is observed only when yij,i =1.
In the model, sgn0 is an indicator function, which is one if the sign of the
argument is positive and minus one otherwise. zij, and zij2 are latent variables that
measure the inclination to be interviewed and funded, which depends on a vector of
individual characteristics. The error terms Eij,l, Eij,2 have the property of bivariate normal
distribution, and p indicates the correlation coefficient between these two error terms.
Finally, I use an entrepreneur-level fixed-effects conditional logit regression
model to alleviate the concern of a rival hypothesis based on firm capability. The network
literature has been weak in identifying an independent effect of social ties on economic
behavior (Munshi 2003; Mouw 2006; Reagans et. al 2007). If social ties to VC help a
startup get financed (whether this occurs at the attention stage or at the evaluation stage),
one has to wonder why not all entrepreneurs develop such ties. It could well be the case
that some unobservable variables hold back both the development of social ties and
capital access (Baum and Silverman 2004; Gompers et. al, 2006). The sociology
literature in particular suggests that homophily induces relationship formation and
maintenance (McPherson, Smith-Love and Cook, 2001). When venture capitalists sort
people into social circles based on capability, highly capable entrepreneurs are both likely
to form connections with VCs and to gain funding from them (Gompers et. al, 2006;
Hallen 2008) 19
This dataset is unique in that it has multiple observations of the same entrepreneur
for different startup/VC pairs, as startups rarely restrict themselves to requesting funding
from only one investor. In an entrepreneur-level fixed-effects model, the entrepreneur's
observed and unobserved characteristics, such as gender and capability, are constant for
all entrepreneur/VC pairs. The only independent variable that varies between
entrepreneur/VC pairs is the method by which the entrepreneurs approach the VC firms.
In this way, it is possible to estimate within-entrepreneur variation in VC funding as a
function of the existence (or absence) of social tie between an entrepreneur and each VC
that he approaches. A similar approach has been taken in the study of scientists' career
choices (Stem 2004), entrepreneurs' selection of VC affiliation (Hsu, 2004), and the role
of social capital in the labor market (Yakubovich 2005).
RESULTS
Displaying each of the three approaches, Figure 2 describes the proportion of
funding offers that the sample firms obtained. It suggests that entrepreneurs are more
likely to be interviewed by VCs with whom they have direct ties (69%) or indirect ties
(60%) than by VCs to which they have no ties (44%). However, the advantages of
network ties become much weaker in the evaluation stage, as reflected by funding offers.
Conditional on being interviewed, 35% of direct tie cases ended in funding offers,
compared with 28% of the indirect tie cases and 22% of the cases without ties.
----- Figure 2 about here -----
Table I shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Both interview
offers and funding offers are positively correlated with the existence of direct and indirect
ties between entrepreneurs and VC firms. However, the correlation is stronger between
direct social ties and interview offers (.22 vs. .17 for funding offers), tentatively
suggesting that networks play a larger role at this early stage of entrepreneur/VC
interactions. The correlation between funding offers and direct ties becomes much
weaker (.10) when we look only at the startup/VC pairs where the startups have actually
entered the evaluation stage (Table 2). The same patterns hold across the two stages for
indirect ties. Collectively, these descriptive statistics suggest that a two-stage conceptual
model is appropriate for understanding how social ties enter into VCs' investment
decisions.
----- Tables 1 & 2 about here -----
Table 3 provides the results of random-effects logit regression models predicting
the likelihood that a startup firm receives funding offers. Following the previous
literature, I build two models that ignore the multi-stage nature of VC decision-making
and focus only on the final outcome of the deal screening process.20 The empirical results
show that, when the awareness and evaluation stages are collapsed into one, social ties
have a strong and significant effect on the likelihood of an entrepreneur receiving VC
funding, controlling for various entrepreneur and firm characteristics.
----- Table 3 about here -----
Model 1 is the baseline model, including both measures of the entrepreneur's
attributes (e.g. human capital, leadership skills, career experience and political status) and
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firm characteristics (e.g. location, initial capital endowment, establishment year, and
industrial sectors). Among the controls, six variables are significant predictors of funding
offers: founder's initial capital commitment (Exp (B) = 1.99, p <.01), high-profile career
experience (Exp (B) = 5.29, p < .05), firm's location in Beijing (Exp (B) = 7.94, p< .01),
telecom industrial sector (Exp (B) = 14.82, p < .01), and VC firm ranking (Exp (B) =.47,
p <.05).
These control variable coefficients provide important insights into VC financing.
As proposed by prior research, VCs are more likely to fund new ventures whose
entrepreneurs have established a successful career path in high-profile startup firms
(Hallen, 2008). This type of work experience both familiarizes entrepreneurs with the
venture creation process and helps them build social connections with key resource
holders such as VCs (Burton, Sorensen and Beckman, 2002). Entrepreneurs' initial
investment also matters, serving as an important signal to potential investors regarding
the entrepreneur's confidence in the business opportunity and commitment to its pursuit.
It may also be a surrogate for prior success of the entrepreneur or for wealthy family
background, both of which may suggest other influences upon VC funding decisions.
Model 2 examines whether entrepreneurs connected with venture capital firms
are more likely to receive funding offers. It shows that funding outcomes are positively
correlated with both direct ties (Exp (B) = 3.08; p < .05) and indirect ties (Exp (B) = 1.78;
p > .10). In addition, the model with network measures fits better than that with controls
alone (likelihood ratio chi-square = 3.58, p < .10). Taken together, these results seem to
confirm prior research that social ties help entrepreneur access key external resources.
----- Tables 4 & 5 about here ----
Tables 4 and 5 provide the results for network effects operating through stages.
Models 3 and 4 relate to the attention stage, examining the relationship between social
ties and an entrepreneur's likelihood of receiving an interview offer; while models 5 and
6 predict the likelihood of receiving a funding offer, given that the entrepreneur has
become part of the VC's consideration set for funding by succeeding at the attention
stage and receiving an interview offer. The first key result is that, based on the change of
coefficients for social tie measures between models 4 and 6, social ties-particularly direct
ones-play a larger role in bringing entrepreneurs to the attention of VC investors (Exp(B)
= 6.03, p <.01) than in helping them gain favorable evaluations (Exp (B) = 1.79, p >.10).
The second key result is that collapsing the two stages into one fails to specify the
mechanism through which social ties work, leading to erroneous conclusions regarding
the role of networks. In the one-stage model, e.g. model 2, social connections,
particularly direct ties, have strong and positive effects on venture financing (Exp (B) =
3.08, p<.05). However, a two-stage model finds no support for this argument (Exp (B) =
1.79 for direct tie, Exp (B) = 0.96 for indirect ties; neither with statistical significance).
This result is not caused by the change of sample size from the one-stage model (i.e.,
model 2) to the evaluation model in a two-stage framework (i.e., model 6). Indeed, the
standard errors of the two models are quite similar to each other, ruling out the possibility
that a smaller sample in the two-stage model renders the network effect insignificant.
More importantly, there is a 49% decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient for direct
ties from the one-stage model (model 2) to the two-stage model (model 6), equaling a 42%
decrease in the odds ratio. Collectively, these results suggest that collapsing the
awareness and evaluation stages together would lead to a conclusion that exaggerates the
role of networks in venture evaluation.
----- Table 6 about here -----
Table 6 presents the results for a different methodological approach. Given the
dyadic nature of the data, observations are clustered around both VCs and entrepreneurs.
To account for this structural feature of the data, I use two-way clustering logit models to
generate cluster-robust inferences about the role of social ties in venture financing. Even
though there are changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients, the basic empirical result
continues to holds: while the one-stage model suggests that networks have a direct effect
on how entrepreneurs are evaluated, a two-stage model demonstrates that the advantages
of entrepreneurs with social ties to the VC rest mainly in the awareness generation stage.
Once in the VC's consideration set, connected firms do not necessarily enjoy large
advantages over their unconnected peers in terms of how they are evaluated.
----- Table 7 about here -----
Table 7 presents the results for the bivariate probit models (BVPM). In
comparison with Model 10 (BVPM without selection), Model 11 (BVPM with selection)
not only takes into account the fact that only firms that have received interviews have the
chance to be funded, but also corrects for the bias introduced by the non-random process
of interview granting. There are three salient features across these models. First, network
measures continue to have a positive and significant effect on an entrepreneur's chance of
receiving an interview, reinforcing the view that social connections help startups gain
attention from potential investors. Second, network measures still do not have significant
effects on how an entrepreneur is evaluated, after controlling for the preceding stage of
selection for interview offers (Model 11). Third, a model (namely, Model 10) that does
not account for the selection process would suggest that social ties play an important role
in how an entrepreneur and his venture are evaluated. The comparison between these two
models provides the most straightforward evidence to support the multi-stage view of
network effect in venture financing, namely that better networked entrepreneurs have an
advantage in getting the initial attention of investors, but that this advantage does not
carry over to evaluation stage. More importantly, ignoring the selection process at the
awareness stage can give misleading conclusions about the role of social networks.
----- Table 8 about here -----
Table 8 presents the results for the fixed-effects models, employing only within-
entrepreneur variation in interview offers and ignoring variation between
entrepreneurNC pairs. Model 12, for interview offers, shows as before that entrepreneurs
are significantly more likely to receive attention from VC firms with whom they are
connected. The VC funding equation, Model 13, provides no support for the argument
that network ties have a strong effect on venture financing. The coefficient for indirect
ties even becomes negative, suggesting that third party referral may have generated social
pressures that make VCs grant interviews to some startups that are not good matches for
their investment portfolios.
Since I estimate within-entrepreneur fixed-effects with entrepreneurNC dyads as
the unit of analysis, I control for any possible sources of variation across entrepreneurs.
Thus, the effects of social contacts are independent of any observable and time-invariant
unobservable attributes of the entrepreneur. This shows that the observed relationship
between social ties and interview offers is not simply attributable to unobserved
capability measures that may cause both network formation and interview offers.
DISCUSSION
The paper provides the first effort to develop a multi-stage view of how social
ties enter into the dynamic process of decision-making in the context of venture financing.
The evidence comes from a dataset that breaks the VC's funding decision into awareness
and evaluation stages. The previous literature collapses these two stages into one. The
question I ask is: Given the availability of alternative and equally effective mechanisms
for VCs to evaluate and monitor funding applicants, why do entrepreneurs with social ties
to VC seem to be more likely to receive VC financing? I find that in the Chinese internet
and telecom sectors, social ties greatly help entrepreneurs gain the attention of VC
investors; however, the role of social ties shrinks dramatically once an entrepreneur is in
a VC's consideration set. In a context where decision-making takes place in stages and
social ties play an important role in determining which options enter the consideration set,
collapsing the awareness and evaluation stages into one will apply the explanatory power
that network ties have at the first stage to the second stage instead, thereby artificially
magnifying the effect of social ties on venture evaluation.
My conclusion that network ties play a larger role during the awareness stage
than at the evaluation stage is based not only on the lack of statistical significance of the
network variables at the evaluation stage, but also on the change of magnitude in their
coefficients from the one-stage model to the two-stage model. Thus, my findings cannot
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be explained solely by the shrinking of sample size due to the filtering effect at the first
stage, where many entrepreneurs fail even to be interviewed by VCs. Additionally, the
finding that entrepreneurs are more likely to receive interview offers from VCs to which
they have social ties is supported both by cross-entrepreneur and within-entrepreneur
comparisons. Thus, this finding cannot be explained by unobservable individual
characteristics of the entrepreneur that correlate with group formation dynamics. In
particular, we can rule out the possibility that variation in entrepreneurial capability alone
underlies both the formation of ties between VCs and entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs'
ability to receive VCs' attention.
Limitations
This paper has several limitations that deserve acknowledgement. First, the
potential threat of recall bias may inflate the estimated effect of networks. If
entrepreneurs perceive a loss of face when they mobilize their social ties but do not
receive favorable outcomes, they may report only those cases where social ties led to
positive outcomes. This is less of a problem for my main result at the second stage, as I
find that the role of social ties is limited regarding how ventures are evaluated. Still, the
positive recall bias may distort the positive finding at the awareness stage.
Second, from several perspectives the firms sampled in this study are among
what are regarded as the best high-tech startups in China. Most of the entrepreneurs I
interviewed graduated from the top universities in China and have advanced degrees.
Quite a few of them went to graduate school overseas and worked in Fortune 500 firms.
One may worry that their high quality attenuates the effects of social networks, as they
may achieve the same outcome independent of costly investment in developing social ties.
However, my analysis (see Table 9) suggests that entrepreneurs with an overseas
education, high-profile career experiences, and student leadership backgrounds, are
among those who most actively mobilize and rely on their network resources. Still, the
focus on top science parks (and consequently the best technology firms in China) does
not allow me to empirically rule out the possibility that social ties may play a much larger
role in the venture evaluations of less advantaged entrepreneurs. However, adding lower-
quality firms should not change the empirical results that I have found in this paper.21
The third limitation is that this paper does not directly test how the two network
effects (information channel vs. social obligation) in the awareness stage may influence
the outcome at the evaluation stage. One interpretation of the non-effect at evaluation can
be that those two first-stage effects are carried over and cancel each other out at the
second stage. Or put it another way, social ties bring firms of different calibers into the
candidate pool: as an information channel, social ties help investors to source high-
quality deals; in contrast, social obligation compels investors to receive connected, low-
quality entrepreneurs whom they would not have interviewed in the absence of social ties.
When VCs make funding decisions based on venture quality, connected firms, given their
polarized quality distribution, will not be more likely to receive money than unconnected
ones. From this perspective, the non-effect in the evaluation stage could be an artifact of
aggregating two network effects of opposite directions. While appealing, this alternative
explanation is valid only for models of cross-firm comparison and does not apply to
conclusions drawn from fixed-effects models that capture within entrepreneur variation
across startup/VC pairs. In these fixed-effects models, a firm's quality is held constant
while its social ties vary. As shown in Table 8, the existence or absence of social ties
does not have a significant effect on venture evaluation. Even though the non-effect result
at the second stage is robust, it would still be interesting for future research to distinguish
between the two mechanisms in the first stage and examine whether and how they affect
the second stage.
Last but not least important, caution should be exercised in generalizing the
results of this study to other settings. For both institutional and cultural reasons, China
serves as a conservative test for the non-effects of social ties in venture evaluation in
comparison to Western society. However, the non-effect may not hold in all developing
economies, particularly in countries where market-supporting institutions are less
developed than in China, and where the VC industry is more controlled by the state. Even
though the courts does not function well in China (Michelson 2007), the rule of law has
rapidly been gaining ground in Chinese society (Orts 2001; Peerenboom 2002). In
addition, the Chinese VC industry has evolved dramatically since the late 1990s as a
result of the withdrawal of direct involvement by the government (White et al. 2005), the
entry of Western investment firms (Liu et al. 2006), and the return of Chinese
entrepreneurs and investors from the U.S. (Saxenian 2006). Despite its many interesting
differences from the West (Ahlstrom et al. 2007), the Chinese VC industry has
professionalized itself enormously over the past decade. Even many state-affiliated VC
firms have adopted American-style incentive systems for fund managers. Though lagging
behind the West, China may be progressing ahead of other transition economies in terms
of VC professionalization and the development of market-supporting institutions. Thus,
the results drawn from this study are more likely to be replicated in studies of U.S. and
Western Europe VC than in the Vietnamese or Eastern European contexts.
Broader Implications
One of the key distinctions between this paper and previous research is its explicit
modeling of decision-making as a multi-stage process composed of 1) awareness
generation and 2) evaluation for selection. Similar multi-stage models have been
developed in the labor market and innovation diffusion literatures. However, each
literature draws different conclusions regarding the role of social ties. For instance, the
innovation diffusion literature finds that social ties matter mainly in the evaluation stage
(Coleman et al., 1966; Lilien and Van den Bulte 2004), while my paper finds their role to
be more prominent during the awareness generation stage. The labor market literature
falls in the middle-scholars find that network ties matter across the two stages but play a
larger role in the first one (Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997; Fernandez et al., 2000).
Comparing the three literatures lets us better understand how social ties enter the
decision-making process and allows us to draw some general conclusions regarding what
type of ties matter. Here, I propose two sets of factors.
First is the number of options available. When a large number of options compete
for decision-makers' attention, limitations on their cognitive ability often constrain them
from engaging in optimal search behavior. Rather than ranking all options and selecting
the best ones, decision-makers often construct some mental criteria and rely on heuristics
or social ties as informational shortcuts (Simon, 1958; Coleman et al., 1966). This holds
in the cases of venture financing and labor markets, where the sheer number of business
proposals or job applications received and the prohibitive cost of investigating each
independently leads VC investors and human resource managers to rely on social ties as
an informational cue regarding the quality of the options where ties exist. As long as the
observable quality of connected options satisfies the selection criteria, they will be given
priority consideration. The drug adoption literature finds contrasting results. The number
of new drugs introduced each year (for any particular type of illness) is limited, and they
often receive enormous publicity through drug makers' commercial campaigns. As a
result, doctors often first become aware of what's new and available on the market
through public channels such as mass media or professional magazines (Coleman et al,
1966).
The second factor is the nature of the social ties. When ties are formed
endogenously through professional means, they are more likely to convey information
based on professional knowledge to help the decision-makers judge the quality of the
referred candidates. However, when the ties are more heterogeneous in nature, including
ties such as friendship and family that are largely exogenous to the business context, as
well as professional ties, decision-makers may be reluctant to rely on these information
sources in making their final decisions. In the case of VC investments in China, since
many of the referrals are made through social ties with people who are not professional
investors or seasoned entrepreneurs, it is understandable that VCs are reluctant to rely on
these information sources in investment decisions, particularly since they can collect
information independently through due diligence and other means. The labor market
context presents similar heterogeneity. Current employees have certain knowledge
regarding the features and requirements for jobs available within their own firms.
However, they are not professional human resource managers and thus have limited
knowledge regarding what types of individuals can best fill these positions. By contrast,
the ties that a doctor consults tend to be other doctors-people who possess the
professional knowledge to help judge the quality of the new medicine.
----- Figure 3 about here -----
In summary, the number of options the decision-makers face and the
heterogeneity in their social ties jointly influence when and to what extent social ties
matter in the decision-making process. When the number of options is large and
alternative information mechanisms cannot be used cost-effectively, decision-makers are
more likely to rely on social ties as information sources to aid in judging quality.
However, once the consideration set becomes small and alternative information
mechanisms can be accessed within time and cognitive constraints, decision-makers
become less dependent on social ties, particularly when the ties are formed outside the
decision-makers' professional domain and their endorsements are relatively
uninformative.
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Figure 1: Venture Capital Investment Process
-wsu "W
Funded Ppsapl
Figure 2: Venture Financing for 72 Startup Firms in Two Chinese University Science
Parks (USPs)
Note: The data have 358 funding requests made by 72 startups. 54 funding requests were
initiated through entreprenues' direct ties with VC firms. In 37 cases, these entrepreneurs
received interviews, resulting in 13 funding offers. 148 funding requests were initiated
through social referrals, of which 89 were granted with interivew opportunities that
resulted in 25 funding offers. In contrast, of the 156 funding requests initiated through
other means, 68 were granted with interview opportunities and 15 with funding offers.
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Figure 3: Comparision of Network Effect across Contexts
Venture Financing (et)
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Option Availability
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the stage at which social ties may play a salient
role in the economic decision-making process. 1st indicates the stage of awareness; 2 nd
indicates the stage of evaluation.
Tablel: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (N= 358)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Funding offer
2 Interview offer
3 Direct ties
4 Indirect ties
5 Ph.D. degree
6 Foreign education
7 High-profile career
8 Party member
9 Student leader
10 College cohort
11 Male
12 Located in Beijing
13 Founder investment
14 Year established
15 Telecom
16 e-Commerce
17 VC ranking
18 Funding requests
Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
1.00
0.41
0.17
0.06
0.05
0.17
0.21
-0.09
0.15
-0.12
-0.05
0.20
0.24
-0.07
0.14
-0.04
-0.18
-0.05
0.16
0.37
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.22 1.00
0.13 -0.37 1.00
0.00 -0.10 0.04 1.00
0.19 0.04 0.05 0.13 1.00
0.15 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.18 1.00
-0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.28 -0.22 1.00
0.18 0.08 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.01
-0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.04 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20
0.00 0.08 -0.08 0.09 -0.07 -0.28 0.06
0.34 0.16 -0.06 -0.10 0.20 0.05 -0.20
0.29 0.16 0.06 0.21 0.30 0.19 -0.01
-0.16 0.05 -0.09 -0.19 -0.13 0.07 -0.25
0.16 0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.09 0.01
-0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.34
-0.09 -0.05 -0.14 -0.06 -0.15 -0.10 0.00
-0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.06
0.54 0.15 0.43 0.08 0.31 0.10 0.39
0.50 0.36 0.50 0.27 0.46 0.29 0.49
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1.00
0.08
-0.09
0.24
0.18
-0.07
-0.09
0.08
-0.01
-0.01
0.11
0.31
0.00
1.00
1.00
-0.01
0.30
-0.25
0.39
-0.20
0.25
0.09
0.13
2.87
0.92
1.00
4.00
1.00
-0.09 1.00
0.11 -0.03 1.00
0.08 0.20 -0.23 1.00
0.08 0.05 0.00 0.16 1.00
-0.09 0.26 -0.21 0.30 -0.14 1.00
0.14 -0.08 -0.09 0.09 0.12 0.02 1.00
0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.08 0.50 1.00
0.91 0.68 4.36 2004 0.07 0.20 1.76 6.91
0.29 0.47 1.13 2.48 0.25 0.40 0.88 5.86
0.00 0.00 1.10 2000 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00 7.60 2007 1.00 1.00 3.00 16.00
Table 2: Correlations between Funding and Social Ties
Full Sample Evaluation Stage only
Direct ties 0.17 0.10
Indirect ties ]0.06 0.01
.. ~_..__. l_.,l.^... ..__..- ? .~ ....~....ll.dl I*IXLI- -X~-. ^ -IIIXX^III~IL-_-^-LI. --I_-I~ -i --l L .-..-I
Table3: Regressions Predicting Funding Offers for USP firms
Selection Effect (of the Attention Stage) not Considered
Model 1 Model 2
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Direct ties 1.13** 0.59 3.08
Indirect ties 0.58 0.48 1.78
Ph.D. degree 0.12 1.04 1.13 0.35 0.96 1.42
Foreign education 0.09 0.65 1.10 0.07 0.60 1.08
Hi-profile career 1.67** 0.98 5.29 1.86** 0.91 6.43
Party member -0.10 0.73 0.90 -0.03 0.68 0.97
Student leader 0.06 0.99 1.06 -0.09 0.91 0.91
College cohort -0.15 0.42 0.86 -0.11 0.39 0.89
Male -0.34 0.96 0.71 -0.33 0.88 0.72
Located in Beijing 2.07*** 0.85 7.94 1.97*** 0.80 7.14
Founder investment 0.69*** 0.29 1.99 0.59** 0.27 1.81
Year established -0.18 0.15 0.84 -0.19* 0.14 0.82
Telecom 2.70*** 1.12 14.82 2.62*** 1.04 13.77
e-Commerce 0.15 0.84 1.16 0.37 0.79 1.45
VC ranking -0.75** 0.33 0.47 -0.63** 0.33 0.53
Funding Requests 0.02 0.03 1.02 0.01 0.03 1.01
N(Group) 358(72) 358(72)
Wald chi-squared(d.f.) 25.9(14)** 31.2(16)
LR chi-square (d.f.) 3.58(2)*
Note: * p< .10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in one-tailed tests.
Models 1 and 2 are entrepreneur-level random-effects logit regressions with
entrepreneur-VC pair data. These models predict a startup firm's likelihood of being
selected for funding by a VC that the entrepreneur has approached, no matter whether
he/she has received an interview offer from the VC firm.
Table4: Regressions
B
Direct ties
Indirect ties
Ph.D. degree
Foreign education
Hi-profile career
Party member
Student leader
College cohort
Male
Located in Beijing
Founder investment
Year established
Telecom
e-Commerce
VC ranking
Funding Requests
N(Group)
Wald chi-squared(d.f.)
-0.87
0.23
1.40**
0.07
0.53
0.53*
0.68
2.66***
0.87***
-0.42 * *
3.60***
-0.02
-0.06
-0.03*
358
39.4(
LR chi-square (d.f.)
Predicting Interview Offers for USP firms
Model 3 Model 4
S.E. Exp(B) B S.E.
1.80*** 0.53
1.21*** 0.36
0.95 0.42 -0.62 0.85
0.58 1.26 0.29 0.52
0.88 4.05 1.87*** 0.81
0.56 1.07 0.14 0.50
0.87 1.69 0.20 0.78
0.35 1.70 0.63** 0.32
0.84 1.97 0.79 0.75
0.64 14.34 2.51*** 0.58
0.26 2.38 0.73*** 0.23
* 0.13 0.66 -0.45*** 0.12
1.25 36.53 3.58*** 1.13
0.65 0.98 0.23 0.59
0.23 0.94 0.10 0.23
0.02 0.97 -0.03* 0.02
3(72) 358(72)
(14)** 55.21(16)
16.65(2)***
Exp(B)
6.03
3.36
0.54
1.33
6.51
1.15
1.23
1.88
2.19
12.34
2.07
0.64
35.96
1.26
1.10
0.97
Note: * p< .10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in one-tailed tests.
Models 3 and 4 are entrepreneur-level random-effects logit regressions with
entrepreneur-VC pair data, predicting an entrepreneur's likelihood of receiving
interview offers.
Table5: Regressions Predicting Funding Offers for USP firms
Selection Effect (of the Attention Stage) Considered
Model 5 Model 6
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Direct ties 0.58 0.62 1.79
Indirect ties 
-0.04 0.52 0.96
Ph.D. degree 0.26 0.95 1.30 0.45 0.97 1.57
Foreign education 0.13 0.58 1.14 0.19 0.59 1.20
Hi-profile career 1.27* 0.93 3.57 1.43* 0.95 4.16
Party member -0.08 0.67 0.92 0.02 0.68 1.02
Student leader 0.21 0.85 1.23 0.12 0.87 1.12
College cohort -0.37 0.36 0.69 -0.35 0.37 0.70
Male -0.48 0.91 0.62 -0.52 0.91 0.59
Located in Beijing 1.00* 0.79 2.71 0.92 0.81 2.52
Founder investment 0.46** 0.25 1.58 0.42** 0.26 1.53
Year established -0.07 0.13 0.93 -0.08 0.13 0.92
Telecom 1.78** 0.95 5.92 1.90** 0.97 6.67
e-Commerce 0.54 0.78 1.71 0.68 0.79 1.97
VC ranking -0.85*** 0.34 0.43 -0.86*** 0.36 0.42
Funding Requests 0.02 0.03 1.02 0.02 0.03 1.02
N(Group) 195(58) 195(58)
Wald chi-squared(d.f.) 18.9(14)** 19.6(16)
LR chi-square (d.f.) 1.60(2)
Note: * p< .10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in one-tailed tests.
Models 5 and 6 are entrepreneur-level random-effects logit regressions with
entrepreneur-VC pair data, predicting an entrepreneur's likelihood of being selected
for funding given that he/she has been interviewed by the VC . The number of groups
drops from 72 to 58 due to the fact that 14 firms received no interview offers.
Table 6: Two-Way Clustering Logit Models Predicting Entrepreneur-VC Interactions in Two Chinese USPs
Direct ties
Indirect ties
Ph.D. degree
Foreign education
Hi-profile career
Party member
Student leader
College cohort
Male
Located in Beijing
Founder investment
Year established
Telecom
e-Commerce
VC ranking
Funding Requests
Constant
B.
1.33
0.83
0.41
0.01
1.50
-0.04
-0.0
-0.2
-0.2
1.82
0.50
-0.1'
1.94
0.44
-0.5(
0.01
282.
Model 7
Collapsed Stage
S.E.
'* 0.70
** 0.49
0.61
0.48
** 0.78
4 0.50
5 0.53
0 0.32
6 1.06
*** 0.74
** 0.26
.4 0.16
*** 0.82
0.74
0*** 0.21
0.02
32 323.89
358
B.
1.96*
1.26*
-0.53
0.22
1.79*
0.07
0.18
0.61"
0.82
2.03*
0.51*
-0.40
3.33*
0.25
0.02
-0.03
794.9
Model 8
Interview Stage
S.E.
c** 0.50
** 0.34
0.42
0.46
** 0.78
0.42
0.70
** 0.23
0.68
** 0.40
** 0.20
*** 0.11
** 0.73
0.52
0.13
*** 0.01
7*** 224.07
358
B.
0.6:
0.1
0.4'
0.0'
1.0:
0.0
0.1'
-0.4
-0.4
0.9
0.3:
-0.A
1.4
0.7
-0.
0.0
131
Clusters: Entrepreneurs 72 72 3
Clusters: VC firms 67 67 60
Note: * p< .10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in one-tailed tests.
Models 7, 8 and 9 are logit regressions with two-dimension clustered standard errors. Model 7 predicts an entrepreneur's likelihood of
receiving funding offers no matter whether he/she has received an interview or not; Model 8 predicts an entrepreneur's likelihood of
receiving interview offers from VCs he/she approached; Model 9 predicts an entrepreneur's likelihood of receiving funding offers from a
VC that has granted him/her interviews. The drop in the numbers of clusters and observations drop between models 8 and 9 is due to the
fact that a subset of firms (VCs) received (granted) no interview offers.
Model 9
Evaluation Stage
S.E.
3 0.70
5 0.53
9 0.67
9 0.48
3 0.95
2 0.48
4 0.63
11" 0.27
6 1.12
7 0.82
5* 0.24
7 0.16
9** 0.66
1 0.68
71*** 0.19
2 0.02
.13 319.32
195
~ ~FT~Ti~~l---^-E
.m
Table 7: Results of
Evaluation Stage
Direct ties
Indirect ties
Ph.D. degree
Foreign education
Hi-profile career
Party member
Student leader
Located in Beijing
Founder investment
Bivariate Probit Model Predicting Funding Offer
Model 10 Model 11
No Control for Selection Control for Selection
B. S.E. B. S.E.
0.61** 0.30 0.52 0.65
0 32* 0.26 0.21 0.55
0.19 0.41 0.29 0.49
0.13 0.26 0.12 0.29
0.68** 0.33 0.62* 0.47
0.06 0.32 0.06 0.35
0.18 0.37 0.16 0.40
0.78*** 0.29 0.67 0.82
0.26*** 0.09 0.24 0.21
Male -0.16 0.37 -0.26 0.44
Year established 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00
College cohort -0.21* 0.16 -0.26 0.22
Telecom 0.97*** 0.34 0.93* 0.59
e-Commerce 0.17 0.29 0.27 0.40
VC ranking -0.33** 0.17 -0.40* 0.29
Funding Requests 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03
Interview Stage
Direct ties 0.92*** 0.26 0.91*** 0.27
Indirect ties 0.62*** 0.17 0.63*** 0.17
Ph.D. degree 0.00 0.33 -0.03 0.34
Foreign education 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.20
Hi-profile career 0.61** 0.34 0.63** 0.34
Party member 0.11 0.20 0.10 0.20
Student leader 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.28
Located in Beijing 1.06*** 0.20 1.05*** 0.20
Founder investment 0.28*** 0.08 0.28*** 0.08
Male 0.15 0.34 0.18 0.34
Year established 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00
College cohort 0.03 0.10 0.04*** 0.10
Telecom 0.94*** 0.40 0.95 0.40
e-Commerce 
-0.19 0.23 -0.20 0.23
VC ranking 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.11
Funding Requests -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Rho 0.99 3.41 0.46 1.94
Log likelihood 
-287.165 
-286.764
N (group) 358 (72) 358(72)
Note: Note: * p< .10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in one-tailed tests.
Models 10 and 11 are bivariate probit regressions predicting funding offer with
entrepreneur-VC pair data. Model 11 controls for selection at the interview stage,
while Model 10 does not.
I
Table 8: Fixed-effects Models for USP Firms
Direct ties
Indirect ties
VC ranking
Funding requests
N(group)
Chi-square(d.f.)
Note: * p <.10; ** p<
Model 12-Interview
B S.E. B
0.87** 0.52 0
0.86** 0.40 -
0.23 0.27
-0.04** 0.03 0
195(38)
19.49(4)***
.05; *** p<.01 in one-tailed tests.
.
0
.(
Model 13-Funding
S.E.
04 0.69
.44 0.55
)7** 0.43
02 0.04
89(17)
10.26(4)**
Models 12 and 13 are entrepreneur-level fixed-effects logit regressions with
entrepreneur-VC pair data. Model 12 predicts an entrepreneur's likelihood of receiving
interview offers; Model 13 predicts an entrepreneur's likelihood of being selected for
funding by a VC that has granted him/her interviews. The number of group drops from
38 to 17 from Model 12 to Model 13 due to the fact that 21 firms have only negative
outcomes for funding offers.
Table 9: Tie Mobilization
Model 14
B S.E.
Student leader 0.73** 0.25
Ph.D. degree -.54** 0.27
Hi-profile career 0.39 0.36
Foreign education 0.34** 0.19
Located in Beijing .30** 0.19
Telecom 0.31 0.31
e-Commerce 0.71** 0.21
Chi-square (d.f.) 27.61(7)***
Psuedo R-square .03
Key: *** = p <.01; ** = p <.05; * = p <.10 in one-tailed test,s.
I [
Chapter Two
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT SEEKING BEHAVIORS OF CHINESE
ENTREPRENERUS (with Yasheng Huang)
What strategies can entrepreneurs adopt to overcome hostile institutional
environments? Why are firms in certain regions particularly willing to form joint ventures
with foreign investors? Could there be any intrinsic linkages between the two issues? By
tying the literature of political economy of institutions and international business, we
address these questions by examining the most popular investment destination in the
developing world: China. We find that the same set of institutional factors that constrain
local firm development also drive Chinese entrepreneurs' eagerness to absorb foreign
direct investment (FDI). Particularly, joint-venture-seeking behaviors are most likely to
happen in regions where the policy differential toward domestic and foreign enterprises is
large. We argue that, although preferential policies toward foreign-invested enterprises
put domestic enterprises into a relatively disadvantaged position, they also create
opportunities for local entrepreneurs to dodge the otherwise constraining institutional
environment. Even though it was not originally designed to serve this purpose, we can
see from this perspective that China's FDI policy essentially helps liberalize the domestic
economic sector.
I. Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that the vulnerability of foreignness - when
foreign firms suffer from discrimination in the host country because of their alien status
- makes it necessary for multinational corporations (MNCs) to possess firm-specific
capabilities to compete with the politically-favored local firms. At the same time, the
local firms pursue foreign equity partnerships in order to gain MNCs' firm-specific
capabilities (Hymer, 1976; Siegel, 2006). We, however, argue that MNCs may benefit
from their foreign nationality by receiving preferential treatment from host governments.
Moreover, under the existence of "foreign privilege," firms may find it more attractive to
conduct cross-border relations through FDI rather than pursuing such alternatives as
contract production, even when the bilateral relationship does not involve the transaction
of firm-specific assets and can be governed through non-FDI mechanisms with at least
equal efficiency.
Our inquiry stems from the observation that many developing countries defy the
theory of firm-specific capability. As industrial organization literature has argued, firm-
specific capabilities are usually developed in industries characterized by imperfect
competition (Hymer, 1976; Knickerbocker, 1973). However, a significant portion of the
FDI in the developing world is supplied by a large number of small MNCs that often
operate in the labor-intensive sectors (Wells, 1984; Huang, 2003). The involvement of a
large number of players makes the market almost perfectly competitive; as a result, it is
nearly impossible for firms to develop unique capabilities. So why would a local firm still
be motivated to pursue equity partnership with a foreign firm? Indeed, under the
condition of perfect competition, according to the logic of transaction cost economics,
their bilateral relationship shall be governed through the price mechanism. Even more
puzzling to the existent theory is the prevalence of "round-trip" FDI in these countries. It
is clear that when domestic capital is funneled abroad and later returns disguised as
foreign capital, it should bring to the parent firm no additional benefits, whether tangible
or intangible. Indeed, if alien status exposes the firm to discriminatories measure-as the
vulnerability of foreignness argument claims-why would a firm choose to make local
capital travel, only to then face discrimination?
The relationship between MNCs and host countries does not have to be
confrontational. Our reasoning for a "foreign privilege" argument is that when a
developing country designates FDI as an integral part of its industrialization effort (even
when it has low credibility in policy commitment), it has to grant MNCs preferential
treatment to compensate for the risks they undertake. This essentially creates a policy
bias against domestic firms and renders alternative mechanisms such as contract
production less attractive than FDI in governing cross-border economic transactions.
When a local firm supplies a foreign firm through contract, it has to carry out the
economic activity (such as material import, production, and final good export) under a
constrained institutional environment that often causes undue delays, high bribery
payments, and a large possibility of future contracts loss. In contrast, foreign equity
partnership helps the local firm to convert its status into foreign-invested enterprise and
in so doing conduct the same activities with less governmental intrusion. From this
perspective, ownership arrangements like FDI does not arise out of its efficiency in
governing bilateral economic transactions; instead, it arises out of its role in transcending
institutional boundaries and thereby reducing the costs of dealing with over-regulative
governments.
This paper makes contributions to our thinking about FDI in three main areas.
First, it explores an often-neglected dimension of FDI dynamics. Since cross-border
equity partnership is a matching process, our "pulling" side story (local firms' pursuit of
FDI) complements the existent "pushing" side story (MNCs' supply of FDI). Second, it
demonstrates that the same set of institutional factors that limit a local firm's
development may also drive its pursuit of foreign equity partnership. Large FDI inflows
may well indicate local economic weakness rather than economic health, as often claimed.
Third, it uses a unique dataset from China-the most popular FDI destination in the
developing world-to test this institutional argument. Although there are many policies
debated over China's FDI-driven development model, empirical studies using fine-
grained data are lagging. Most of the existent works focus on macro-dynamics while only
using provincial- or industrial-level data. For the few firm-level studies, data is either
collected from a small geographic space, or contains limited information on firm
characteristics. In contrast, our data set is drawn from a nationwide survey and has
detailed information on both firm and owner characteristics.
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. In the next part, we review
the established literature to demonstrate that contractual arrangements could be made
more efficient in the competitive market. We then develop an institutional argument to
explain why a local firm may prefer a foreign equity partnership to the alternatives. The
fourth section gives a detailed description of our empirical data and statistical results, and
the final section explores theoretical discussions and conclusions.
A. Ownership Arrangement vs. Contractual Arrangement
FDI is essentially an ownership arrangement through which MNCs exercise direct
management control over domestic assets (Hymer, 1976). It is one of the many modes by
which a domestic firm and a foreign firm can organize their economic relations.
Alternatives-including technological licensing, asset renting, and contract supply-are
contractual in nature and are coordinated through the price mechanism. Therefore, a
theory of FDI has to explain why an ownership arrangement is chosen over the price
mechanism (Buckley and Casson, 1975). According to the logic of transaction cost
economics, when choosing among alternative modes of organizing economic activities,
firms choose the one that minimizes transaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Empirical
studies have also demonstrated that unilateral contract is the de facto governance mode
unless the external market is imperfect, in which case "contractual hazards" are generated
(Oxley, 1997).
Market imperfections arise from many sources, one of which is known as the
small-numbers bargaining problem. When there is horizontal or bilateral monopoly or
oligopoly, some form of collusion will be profitable. One form is for the various
enterprises to be owned and controlled by one (Hymer, 1976). Firms can also collude
through cross-investment, thus holding each other hostage (Buckley and Casson, 1976).
Another type of market imperfection is the absence of the market for intermediate goods,
such as firm-specific capabilities. When such a market is well developed, an MNC can
rent or sell its skills to a local firm rather than undertaking its own foreign operation.
However, when there is information inequality between seller and buyer, it is difficult for
the two sides to write a contract to complete the transaction. Under such a situation, the
MNC may "not be able to appropriate fully the returns of the ability unless it controls its
use" (Hymer, 1976: 26).
As mentioned before, a significant proportion of FDI in developing countries is
supplied by small MNCs operating in the competitive market. As McManus notes, in
perfectly competitive markets all economic interdependences can be organized through
external market mechanisms where a large number of players react to prices (1972).
Hymer makes a similar point, arguing that "[i]t is important to stress that both of these
reasons for not licensing disappear if there are many buyers of the advantage. It is the
market impurity which leads to the possessor of the advantage to choose to supersede the
market for his advantage"(Hymer, 1976: 49). Even though we cannot deny the existence
of small-bargaining problems in the relationship between some large multinational firms
and local entrepreneurs, there are no theoretical reasons for us to believe these small-
bargaining problems play a significant role in inducing local entrepreneurs to embrace an
ownership arrangement with small MNCs that are often prevalent in the host country.
It is often argued that MNCs invest in developing countries for specific
advantages, such as cheap labor costs. If exploitation of local factor endowments is the
motivation, an investor will do well to contract production to local producers, but there is
no logical necessity for him to control the enterprise from which he buys the final
products (Huang, 2006). In such a market, labor-intensive industries are perfectly
competitive where the terms of trade are automatically revealed. If any seller tries to bluff
about the price, buyers will turn to someone else. Trust is not an issue, either. Given the
large number of suppliers/buyers available, contracts can be broken with short notice, and
the switching costs are kept to a minimum. As a result of low switching costs, the market
can quickly adjust to more efficient levels depending upon supply and demand. Finally,
monitoring is not a serious problem, as industry standards are well established and quality
control is easily enforced.
In competitive industries, there is no profit to be derived from substituting
contract manufacturing with direct control of foreign production. According to Hymer,
one shall not observe direct investment in industries with many small firms, "for if there
are many firms, entry is probably easy, and local firms with the special advantages of
their nationality will predominate" (Hymer, 1976: 49). Yet, for some reason, certain
developing countries attract equity investment from a large number of small MNCs that
operate in the competitive market (Wells, 1984; Huang, 2003; UNCTA, 2006). This
phenomenon has not been appropriately investigated. Specifically, it may be the case that
even though equity investment is not superior to governing economic transactions
between a domestic firm and a foreign firm, it conveys institutional benefits to the
domestic firm that a contractual arrangement does not. In the following section, we will
further explain the theoretical basis for this argument.
B. An Institutional Story of Local Firms' FDI-Seeking Behaviors
There is a long tradition of studying the relationship between MNCs and host
country governments (Vernon, 1971; Kobrin, 1987). One central theme is that MNCs
suffer from discriminations that their local counterparts do not bear. These
discriminations may take many forms but are nationality-based: because of their alien
status, foreign firms are often denied access to the local capital market, export/import
licenses, and special subsidiary programs (Hennart, 1982).' According to Hymer, the
"vulnerability of foreignness" makes the possession of firm-specific capabilities a
prerequisite for an MNC's successful overseas operations (Hymer, 1976).
The recent literature has particularly focused on the host country's institutional
structure and its capability in credibly committing itself. In a country with weak
institutional checks and balances, the government may change policies unilaterally at the
cost of foreign investors (Henisz, 1999). To reduce the hazards, MNCs are often willing
to exchange their firm-specific assets with local firms for their relational assets,
especially influence on governmental behaviors. Studies in weak institutional contexts
such as South Korea and Indonesia show that MNCs are much more likely to form joint
ventures with politically connected local firms than with unconnected local firms (Siegel,
2006; Purbasari and Mobarak, 2006). However, this asset-exchange story does not
explain why a local firm and a foreign firm would want to substitute contract production
with equity partnership in the competitive market. Indeed, contractual arrangement has
advantages particularly when foreign ownership invites significant political
discrimination, as it doesn't require the foreign firms to make any investment in fixed
assets locally, which leaves the government unable to expropriate anything.
i As Vernon remarks, "governments are gradually extending and solidifying the principle that local corporations...have
rights and privileges that are determined in considerable measure by the identity of their stockholders" (1971: 244).
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The relationship between MNCs and host governments does not have to be
confrontational, as often argued. In recent years, many countries have begun to perceive
FDI as an integral part of their economic development. Some developing countries that
were traditionally discriminatory have recently been particularly aggressive in attracting
FDI. This is caused in part by their institutional weakness, which leads to low
commitment credibility. To compensate for the risks, MNCs need to be offered large
policy concessions in order to enter these countries2. The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publishes annual data on "changes in national
regulations of FDI." It reports that from 1991 to 2002, "the use of locational incentives to
attract FDI has considerably expanded in frequency and value" (UNCTAD, 2003: 124).
The report also shows that most of these preferences are offered by developing countries
that have yet to build policy credentials.
Rulers of authoritarian regimes may also promote FDI for political reasons. If
general economic liberalization unleashes the economic power of those who are
politically discontent, partially liberalizing the economy to foreign investors may seem
attractive for a ruler3 . Given their alien status, foreign investors may help the national
economy grow but not make political demands, such as democratization, that threaten the
ruler's control. Studies of China suggest that FDI has helped the ruling party continue
channeling precious financial resources to the socialist economic sector (Huang, 2003) to
suppress labor movements and tighten general control over society (Gallagher, 2002).
Evans' finds that in some Latin American countries, MNCs formed alliances with
military leaders and large, conservative private capital at the cost of small local firms,
which were perceived to breed democratic movements (1979). In summary, even a
repressive regime may not be hostile to foreign investors, depending on its industrial
policy and domestic political dynamics.
2 Hereafter, we shall call policy concessions to foreign investors as FDI concessions.
3 As remarked by Huntington, one of the leading political scientists of the 20& century, the main threat to an
authoritarian regime is the "diversification of the elite resulting form the rise of new groups controlling
autonomous sources of economic power, that is, from the development of an independently wealthy
business and industrial middle class" (1970:20).
The most common incentive to attract MNCs is the grant of some kind of income
tax exemption or reduction. However, policy concessions to foreign investors do not stop
here. Using data from the World Business Environment Survey on more than 10,000
firms across 81 countries, Huang found that foreign firms enjoy significant regulatory
advantages over domestic firms in a broad range of issues, including loosened
environment and labor regulations, streamlined administrative procedures, and privileged
access to export and import licenses (Huang, 2004). In some cases, concessions made to
foreign firms are so large that scholars have expressed fear that host countries are losing
sovereign control (Strange, 1996) and that local enterprises are being "crowded out" by
the MNCs (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2004).
Even though FDI concessions are often off-limits to domestic firms, they provide
a channel for the latter to evade institutional constraints. In many countries, joint ventures
of equity partnership are categorized as foreign invested enterprises, as long as the
foreign shares reach a certain government-specified level. These joint ventures are fully
eligible to FDI concessions. Simply put, the absorption of FDI helps a domestic firm to
transform its legal status from domestic to foreign and thus opens the door for it to cross
institutional boundaries and gain access better treatment. In contrast, alternative
arrangements such as contract production do not involve ownership change and cannot
aid in status conversion, even though they may be technically superior in terms of
governing the economic transactions.
Equity partnership with foreign investors is not costly for domestic firms. It takes
time and money to find a foreign partner who is willing to make investments in the local
firm. Also, equity partnership makes the two sides share control and residual claims
rights. Since each partner can only claim a fraction of the residual, it may find it
advantageous to maximize its own gain at the expense of the venture. This fraction could
be most severe when the foreign firm's parent organization wants to use the joint venture
as a tool for the benefit of worldwide tax planning (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2004).
Devoid of institutional bias, a domestic firm would not harvest any benefit from this
status transformation, particularly when it is operating in a competitive market; however,
its calculation would be different when the local institution is restrictive. In many
developing countries, a local firm often finds that the morass of licenses, approvals, and
permits requires high bribery payment and causes undue delays. In contract production,
any failure to supply foreign buyers on schedule would make a local firm face significant
loss, not only fines for contract breach but also the loss of future orders. When foreign
status reduces regulative harassment, the transaction partners will find it attractive to
make an ownership arrangement rather than transacting through the market. From this
perspective, the pursuit of FDI is essentially to dodge institutional constraints.
FDI-seeking behaviors could vary substantially within a given country,
particularly when local governments retain certain authorities for policy initiation.
Empirical studies have demonstrated the importance of this regional difference in both
the FDI context and others. For instance, Berkowitz and DeJong (2002) find that new
firm formation varies across regions in transitional Russia and highly correlates with the
local support for political and economic reforms. Huang and Di's comparison (2005) of
two neighboring Chinese provinces finds that firms located in the private enterprise-
friendly region are less likely to seek out FDIs.
Hypothesis 1: A local firm's probability of engaging in FDI-seeking
behavior increases in proportion to the level of institutional constraints
imposed upon domestic firms.
Hypothesis 2: A local firm's probability of engaging in FDI-seeking
behavior increases in proportion to the level of preferential policies granted
to foreign-invested enterprises.
The institutional incentives for FDI-seeking behaviors may also depend on a local
firm's political status. In institutionally weak countries, governments do not treat all types
of firms equally. While politically connected firms are often granted regulatory
exemptions, exclusive licenses, and governmental subsidies, those unconnected ones
have to suffer from poor property rights protection, pay higher taxes, and go through
onerous regulatory procedures to operate a business (Siegel, 2006; Mobarak and
Purbasari, 2006). The work of Fisman (2001) concludes that, in Indonesia, a considerable
percentage of well-connected firms' value comes from political connections with the
then-president Suharto. Qualitative studies by Huang (2003) of China and Jones and
Gomez (1997) of Malaysia also demonstrate that government may design FDI policy in
such a way to protect the politically favored firms and expose those disfavored ones to
greater foreign competition.
Hypothesis 3: A local firm's probability of engaging in FDI-seeking
behavior increases in proportion to the level of political discrimination
that it faces.
MNCs are not privileged over local enterprises across the world. Some countries,
such as North Korea, hold strong anti-FDI stances. In these countries, FDI is not
perceived to be part of the national industrialization plan and MNCs are even prohibited
from entering their borders. One may not observe large FDI concessions in mature
democratic countries, either. When a country's electoral system functions well,
politicians have to court their local constituencies. Any concession to foreign investors
that exclude domestic firms will invite political backslash and be punished when the
election comes. Indeed, the World Bank's Investment Climate data consistently show that
in mature democracies such as Germany, Greece, and Portugal, domestic firms
consistently receive better treatment from politicians. For instance, they pay fewer bribes
to "get things done," experience shorter delays in getting utility suppliers, and spend less
time dealing with tax bureaus than foreign firms. In contrast, foreign firms are much
more advantaged in less democratic countries, such as Indonesia, China, and Malaysia.
To summarize, we think that a domestic firm is more likely to use foreign equity
partnership to avoid institutional constraints in the following context. First, the regime
has low credibility in terms of making policy commitment. This condition makes it
necessary for the regime to make FDI concessions if it wants to attract MNCs. Second,
the regime's leaders have high discretionary powers and their political careers are not
determined by citizens' ballots. This condition makes it possible for the leaders to make
FDI concessions without fear of being punished by domestic investors. Third, the regime
needs to perceive FDI as an integral part of its industrialization plan; otherwise, it would
have no incentives to make concessions to MNCs. In sum, FDI-seeking behaviors are
more likely to be present in countries with weak institutional checks and balances but that
are willing to embrace foreign investors.
IHl. Empirical Setting
In this section, we shall describe how we plan to test our hypotheses. We have
chosen to examine FDI in the context of China, as this country provides an appropriate
setting to test our argument for institutional weakness. There are several additional
advantages to examining China, especially considering China's FDI-driven development
model.
A. Institutions in China: One Country, Two Systems
Most scholars perceive institutional checks and balances to be missing in China.
For instance, the country is consistently ranked among the worst countries in judicial
independence and political and economic freedoms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-
Eleches, and Shleifer, 2004; Heritage Foundation, 2002). 4 Nevertheless, institutional
weakness does not prevent China from embracing an "Open Door" policy. The nation has
been the most popular FDI destiny in the developing world since 1993. By the end of
2003, it had received more than $500 billion in utilized FDI, second only to the United
States (UNCTAD, 2005).5
How exactly did China manage to draw so much FDI? To attract FDI, China
offered foreign investors a wide range of preferential policies that were off-limits to
domestic investors, particularly domestic private investors. This policy bias essentially
4 China also scores the lowest grade in Henisz's (2002) political constraint measurement in terms of the existence of
veto players in the institutional process. When informal "accounting groups" are taken into consideration, it scores a bit
better, receiving a modest 3 in the scale of 7. Among the 160 countries measured, only 36 are ranked worse (Marshall
and Jaggars, 2003).
s Interestingly, regional governments in China do not hold the same level of enthusiasm toward foreign investors as the
central government. In the past two decades, the central government has been delegating authorities to the regional
governments. While some regions prioritize MNCs over domestic investors, others hold more encouraging attitudes
toward local firms. Institutional differences across regions make it possible for us to test our argument using a dataset
collected in a single country.
creates two economic systems within the country: one foreign with favorable treatments,
another domestic with excessive constraints. One can only grasp the dichotomy between
the two economic systems by comparing the government's treatment across three
dimensions-property rights, finance, and regulation.
Property Rights
Domestic firms and foreign firms faced very different legal treatments, with
foreign firms being vastly favored. The Chinese government did not grant domestic non-
state enterprises legal recognition until very recently. In contrast, from the very beginning
of the reform, the government has taken comprehensive procedures to protect foreign
investors' property rights. In 1979, the National Congress promulgated the Equity Joint
Venture Law, making an explicit commitment not to nationalize or expropriate the assets
of foreign investors without "due cause and compensation." This provision was
subsequently written into the 1982 National Constitution. The treatment of foreign
invested enterprises became further codified with the passage of the "Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprise Law" in 1986 and the "Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law"
in 1988. In contrast, legal protection of domestic firms, particularly private firms, was
much weaker and lagged far behind. For most of the 1980s, there was barely any legal
clause in the National Constitution specifying the legal status of domestic private
enterprises. 6 It was not until 1999 that the Chinese government recognized private
enterprise as a "component" of the Chinese economy. This meant, at least nominally, that
private firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were to have an equal status. And it
was not until 2004 that the government pledged protection of property rights to private
businesses, a right the foreign firms investing in China have enjoyed since 1982.
Finance
6 The 1982 Constitution acknowledged the property rights of self-employed private businesses but not of other types of
private firms. The 1988 constitutional amendment added a clause, claiming to "permit" private firms and to protect
their "lawful rights and interests." But the same amendment also subordinated the private sector to "a complement to
the socialist public economy," which meant that private firms were allowed entry only in industries where they did not
pose a competitive threat to the SOEs.
Domestic private firms have difficulty in accessing bank loans. This condition is
partially caused by their low position in the regime's political pecking order, as the state-
owned banks typically allocate credits based on political favoritism (Huang, 2003). This
condition is also due to the firms' legal status: Lacking legal recognition of their property
rights, domestic private firms cannot use their assets as collaterals for bank credits. Until
recently, lending to private firms was a miniscule proportion of Chinese bank loan
portfolios. For instance, in 1996, only 0.1% of the new loans went to purely private
enterprises. In comparison, foreign-invested enterprises accounted for about 3% of new
lending and the loss-making SOEs got the lion's share. The Chinese government even
designated special policies to ease foreign investors' credit constraints. The 1986
"Regulations to Encourage Foreign Investments" issued by the State Council explicitly
required the Bank of China to give loan priority to qualified foreign firms. However, the
same treatment was never granted to domestic private firms. Equity financing was also
difficult for private firms. In the 1990s, China's two stock exchanges primarily served as
fund-raising vehicles for the SOEs and non-state listed companies accounted for around 3%
of all domestically listed companies (So, 2000; Walter and Howie, 2003). 7
Regulations
Not surprisingly, China's regulatory institutions also treat domestic and foreign
enterprises differently. To attract FDI, the government has adopted several approaches to
streamline bureaucratic procedures for MNCs. For instance, the State Council issued
"Regulations to Encourage Foreign Investments" in 1986 that stipulated a three-month
period for a foreign investment project to be notified of the approval result. It took about
ten years of reforms for domestic entrepreneurs to receive similar treatment.8 Domestic
7 To finance firm development, Chinese entrepreneurs rely heavily on informal channels, such as borrowing from
family, friends, and private (often illegal) credit agencies (Tsai, 2002). Although it is argued that informal mechanisms
are quite effective in financing firm growth in China (Allen, Qian and Qian 2005), household data has demonstrated
that they are not good substitutes for formal credit (Feder, Lau, Lin and Luo, 1990). Anecdotal evidence shows that,
compared with official banking, firms borrowing through alternative channels often suffer from higher interest rates
and shorter loan durations (Tsai, 2004).
8 The 1999 data shows that, to operate a business, domestic entrepreneurs spent on average 92 days to get various
licenses (Djankov et al, 2001).
entrepreneurs also face more restriction than foreign enterprises in terms of entry permit
and export and import rights. By 2002, China had opened more than 80 industrial sectors
to FDI but only 40 sectors to domestic private investment (Huang, 2003). When it came
to international transactions, while foreign invested firms could directly export and
import products within their business lines, most private firms were required to go
through official state-owned trading corporations. This situation lasted until at least 1999.
To say that domestic and foreign invested firms have not played on a level field in
China during the reform era is an understatement. In Table 1, we show the results from a
business survey conducted by the World Bank. Notice how most of the indicators
measuring investments' institutional climates show that domestic firms score lower than
foreign enterprises, despite domestic firms' superior familiarity of the institutional system.
We want to explore how this institutional bias renders fewer alternative modes than
foreign equity partnership in governing Chinese firms' cross-border relationships.
B. Data
The data used in this study come from a nationwide survey of non-state domestic
enterprises. The survey was jointly conducted in 1995 by the All China Federation of
Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) and the United Front Work Department of the Chinese
Communist Party's Central Committee (CCPCC). The questionnaire was designed by a
panel of scholars from the Research Division of ACFIC, the Policy Research Office of
CCPCC, People's University of China, China Academy of Social Sciences, and Beijing
Academy of Social Sciences. The dataset is by far the best available for studying non-
state enterprises in China. Firms were selected from the population of all registered non-
state enterprises in the country's 30 provincial-level administrative regions using a staged
sampling method. 9 Out of 3,635 firms sampled (about 0.5% of the population), 2,948
firms were still in operation and their owners were interviewed. 10
9 In the year of 1994, a national level conference was held in Hainan Province to determine the number of enterprises to
be surveyed in each province based on a .5 percentage sample. For instance, if Province A had 20,000 non-state
enterprises, 100 firms would be the sample size in the region, as 20,000 x .5% = 100. In the second stage, based on
enterprise registration data from each province's Bureau of Industry and Commerce, the number of urban and rural
enterprises to be survey was calculated. For instance, if 12,000 out of the 20,000 non-state enterprises in province A
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Face-to-face interviews were conducted with the firms' owners, the questions
covering many aspects including the firm's size, history, and basic financial,
technological, and human resource information, together with the owners' demographic
information, educational background, and working experiences. The survey asked owners
to subjectively evaluate various institutional environments. These questions were asked
in particular ways to reduce political sensitivity. For instance, rather than directly asking
the owner whether her firm experienced governmental discrimination, the survey asked
whether she perceives that the government could build a better relationship with non-state
enterprises through reducing political and economic discrimination. Other studies have
shown that such positive framing helps to solicit genuine opinions.
A preliminary analysis of the data shows that Chinese non-state enterprises are
eager to absorb foreign equity investment. Out of the 2,869 firms with relevant data,
1,254 (43.7 %) are either in the process of forming joint ventures with foreign investors
or plan to do it in the next three to five years." Table 2 shows mean values of the
characteristic metrics for the two groups of firms with different FDI-seeking attitudes. It
seems that FDI-seeking entrepreneurs are on average younger and better educated than
the non FDI-seeking entrepreneurs. However, the differences are not substantively large.
With respect to age, the first group is only 8 months younger than the second group
(41.57 years vs. 42.24 years). With roughly the same length of establishment (5.7 years),
FDI-seeking firms are much larger in terms of employee size (144.7 vs. 54.25) and the
number of technicians (14.24 vs. 5.34). However, the two firm types are not different
from each other in terms of technological complexity, measured by the number of
technicians as percentage of employee size-both are around 14%. FDI-seeking firms do
not seem to have higher liquidity constraints than non-seeking firms, either. Although the
were located in an urban area, then 60 of them needed to be surveyed as 100 x (12,000/20,000) = 60. The number of
firms in each industry to be survey in each region was calculated in the same way. For each firm surveyed, the owner
was also interviewed. In the case of cooperate enterprises, the largest investor was interviewed.
10 To examine the representativeness of the data, we checked the data with various Chinese statistical yearbooks,
discovering that the survey under-sampled small firms, particularly those household enterprises with less than seven
employees. This may reflect that small firms are more likely to fail under competition and that the missing observations
may come disproportionately from this subgroup. We do not think this will influence our results in any meaningful way.
"1 Even though the "three to five years" framing with regard to future behavior is a bit long in terms of time duration, it
at least helps to distinguish firms with the pursuit of foreign equity partnership in mind from those never having
thought of this option.
mean net profit of FDI-seeking firms in 1994 is lower than the non-seekers, a two-sample
T-test shows the difference is not statistically significant due to the wide range of
variation within groups. The last three rows of Table 2 show that FDI-seeking firms, as
expected, are more integrated with the world economy: They are oftentimes located in the
coastal region and have both foreign sales and international suppliers.
C. Variables: Definition and Measurement
Our outcome variable is FOR INT, an ordinal variable that measures domestic
non-state enterprise's FDI-seeking behaviors. The survey asks local entrepreneurs
whether 1) they do not plan or have not thought of forming joint ventures with foreign
investors, 2) they plan to form joint ventures with foreign investors in the next three to
five years, or 3) they are in the process of forming joint ventures at the current moment.
FOR_INT takes on values from 1 to 3, with larger values indicating that the firm is more
willing to form joint ventures with foreign investors. 12 Looking at the FDI-seeking
disposition allows us to test how perceived institutional environments influence domestic
enterprises differently. Direct comparison of international joint ventures with domestic
firms could draw misleading conclusions, as firms operating in the foreign sectors tend to
face less restriction.
Our explanatory variables are formed by a battery of metrics geared toward
determining institutional heterogeneity across regions. They are the aggregation of local
entrepreneurs' opinions within each province. Guided by previous works on institutions
and economic development (North, 1981; Levine, 1997; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003;
Huang, 2003), we focus on the security of property rights, access to bank credit, and
political discrimination.
12 The survey also asks the local entrepreneur whether her firm is a joint venture already. There are 79 joint venture
firms in the original dataset. For our main statistical analysis, we deleted these firms but reincorporated them for a
robustness check. As discussed later, incorporating them in regression analysis gives our arguments stronger statistical
support.
Like all other survey-based research, our measurement may suffer from
subjectivity. Three factors make us believe this does not pose a serious problem to the
research at hand. First, entrepreneurs behave on their subjectively perceived environment,
as demonstrated by previous researchers (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002; Cull
and Xu, 2005). Second, the survey questions are designed to solicit owners' genuine
evaluation of the institutions. To reduce political sensitivity, many of the institutional
questions are set in a positive tone. Third, even if individual entrepreneurs could make
errors in evaluating the environment, the aggregation can still be unbiased because our
sample is representative, surveying 0.5 percent of non-state enterprises in each province;
thereby "noises" are cancelled out.
Three measures of property right regime are constructed. The first variable
measures the extent to which the government expropriates local firms' revenues
(GOVT_EXPROPRIATE). It is the provincial aggregation of entrepreneurs' response to
the question: "What percentage of your firm's revenue in the year of 1994 was made to
the government as 'extra-tax financial contributions'?" 13 These "extra-tax" burdens vary
across regions and in some cases are very substantial. Our data shows that, in some
regions an average firm "contributes" up to 4% of its revenue to the local government.
Even though firms in those business-friendly regions are not exempt from the
expropriation, their payment is much lower. For instance, in Zhejiang, a province well
known for being friendly to domestic private enterprises, an average firm "contributes"
only 0.8% of revenue to government (see Table 3 for comparisons with other provinces).
Some Chinese scholars have argued that this factor best captures regional variations in
the investment environment (Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2005).
The second measure is designed to capture the owners' perception of the
insufficiency of property rights legislation (PRLAW_ABSENT). 14 Given that property
13 These "contributions" could come under various covers, such as mandatory magazine subscription, "administrative
fees," and arbitrarily required "donations". Although local government often justifies these "donation" requests in
terms of corporate social responsibility, these extra-tax financial burdens are not subscribed by any law or official
policies but are essentially governmental expropriations that blandly violate private property rights.
14 Entrepreneurs were asked: "Which one of the following factors hinders the development of your firm most severely?
rights legislation is carried out at the national level, one might expect little variation in
survey responses in a relatively authoritarian country such as China. However, the means
and standard deviation reported in Table 4 indicate a moderate variation in the responses
across regions. Once again, the renowned entrepreneurial province, Zhejiang, has one of
the lowest scores, indicating better property rights protections.
The third variable measures the extent of property rights insecurity caused by
social actors (SOCIAL_EXPROPRIATE). Entrepreneurs were asked to evaluate whether
they feel the government has done enough to help protect their own safety and that of
family members on the scale of 1 to 3, with higher values indicating insufficiency. More
than 86% firms chose either the value of 1 (sufficient) or 2 (okay); the mean is 1.80 but
the standard deviation is only 0.14.
Even though this variable directly measures law and order in the society, the
China context makes us believe that it can approximate the social infringement of
property rights. It has been widely published that Chinese entrepreneurs and family
members are often the targets of abductions for ransom by gangsters and unorganized
criminals (The Standard, 2006). As the demand piled up, China Pacific Insurance Group
recently introduced a new insurance policy-Abduction Insurance-primarily targeting
managers and private entrepreneurs (China Insurance, 2004).
Two measures of the financial institution faced by non-state enterprises are
constructed. The first variable asks entrepreneurs whether they have difficulty in getting
access to external financing (FINANCE_DIFFICULTY). One concern for this
measurement is that, denied credit for an individual firm may reflect either policy
restrictions or the firm's heterogeneity, such as bad reputations, inferior market
performance, or the lack of collaterals. However, given that FINANCE DIFFICULTY is
1) Property rights legislation; 2) newspaper propaganda; 3) taxation policy; 4) credit policy; 5) macroeconomic policy;
6) industry and commerce administration; 7) labor market regulation; 8) household registration system; 9) social
security; and 10) ownership issues." We are interested in the percentage of firms within a region choosing the property
rights legislation as the answer.
a provincial-level aggregate measurement, it is more likely to capture the general
financial environment that an average enterprise faces rather than firm idiosyncrasy.
The second variable directly asks entrepreneurs what factors contribute to their
financial difficulty (FINANCE_POLICY_CONSTRAINT), be it "policy restriction,"
"governmental heckling," "market competition," or "factors within the firm." The last
two factors are more likely to capture individualistic causes of financial constraint. In
contrast, the first two factors are more likely to capture the institutional causes. Table 4
shows that non-state enterprises consistently face high financial constraints in China-
only around 30% of firms claim not to have difficulty in external financing and more than
60% of firms contribute the difficulty to institutional or policy factors.
We also constructed two variables to measure preferential treatments granted to
foreign invested enterprises. Following the established literature, we use the number and
history of each province's "Open Economic Zones" as the policy index (Cheng and
Kwan, 2000; Demurger et al., 2002). Although foreign investors are welcomed all across
China, certain regions were opened up much earlier and designated with more open zones.
The variable FDIPOLICY measures the average number of zones a province had during
the period of 1982 to 1994 (see Appendix III for details). 15 Within a province, there could
also be policy differences, as not all municipalities are designated as open zones. Even
for joint ventures in a zone-rich province, they may have difficulties in getting zone-
specific preferential treatments if they are located in a non-zone region. To capture this
variation, we construct a dummy variable ZONE_CITY to measure whether the firm is
located in a city/region with open-zone status, with the value 1 indicating "yes."
is The reason we used a chronically weighted number of zones rather than simple count is to take into consideration
that policy implementation and improvement take time. The granting of a zone status does not mean preferential
policies would be put into service instantly. Instead, it involved delays. For two regions with the same number of
zones in 1994, we assume that the ones that were opened up earlier and had a higher average number of zones for
the period would be better enforcers of FDI preferential policies. We also construct a variable FDI_ZONE counting
each province's number of zones in the year of 1994. It turns out that FDIZONE and FDI_POLICY highly correlate with
each other (correlation > .83) and our analytical results do not change in any substantive way when we replace one
variable with another. Thus, we only report the coefficient for FDI_POLICY in our regression tables.
Last, two variables are constructed to measure discrimination. The first one is
DISCRIMATION, a provincial level aggregation of entrepreneurs' perception of political
and/or economic unfair treatment.16 Our second variable is PRIVATE_ENTERPRISE, a
dummy variable measuring firms' ownership type. Firms in the same region may face
different levels of institutional constraint, and the government often ranks firms
according to standards other than economic efficiency. In other developing country
contexts, it has been demonstrated that an entrepreneur's political affiliations (Siegel,
2005), ethnicity (Macintyre, 1994; Folk and Jomo, 2003), and even religious affiliation
influence his or her access to government-regulated resources. China has been shown to
have a political pecking order based on the ownership type of firms, in which domestic
private firms are ranked at the bottom and face the most extreme constraints in terms of
business opportunities, political support and even legal protections (Huang, 2003). We
code private firms as 1 for this variable, indexing a high level of discrimination.
While none of these measures can capture the institutional environment accurately,
together they do provide us with a richer picture than we would have if only one of the
indicators was utilized. Table 3 lists values of key institutional variables for each
province. The data seem to show two patterns. First, institutions vary quite dramatically
within China. This resonates well with the view that decentralization of authority during
the reform era has generated institutional heterogeneity within the country (Naughton and
Yang, 2004). Second, the ranks of each province across institutional measures vary but
certain provinces do score better than others across the board. To ensure an easy
interpretation of our analytical results, we have coded all the institutional variables in
such a way that a higher score indexes a more constraining/favorable environment for
domestic/foreign enterprises.
IV. Empirical Estimation and Findings
16 Rather than asking directly whether the entrepreneur feels the government discriminates against her enterprise, the
survey puts a positive spin on the question. It asks the entrepreneur whether the government could build a better
corporate-government relationship through the reduction of political and economic discrimination against non-state
enterprises. This framing helps to solicit genuine views from the interviewee by reducing political sensitivity to a
minimum.
Given that our outcome variable FOR INT is an ordinal outcome, we use an
ordered logit model to empirically estimate the likelihood of non-state enterprises' FDI-
seeking behavior. 17 As our data are clustered by region, robust standard errors are
reported. Analytical results are presented in Tables 5-8, which all consistently show
strong evidence that Chinese firms' FDI-seeking behaviors correlate with the local
institutional environment and the firm's position in the political ranking. Table 9 shows
some weak evidence of interaction effects between preferential policy to foreign firms
and institutional bias against domestic firms. All these results indicate that one major
motivation for the FDI-seeking behavior of Chinese non-state enterprise is a desire to
dodge institutional constraints that hinder their own development.
In our baseline specification, FOR_INT is regressed on institutional factors, while
controlling industrial sectors. 18 Table 5 shows that most of the coefficients pertaining to
the institutional environment are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Firms in regions of higher political discrimination (columns 6 and 7), harsher
governmental predations (column 3), and denied bank access (columns 4 and 5), are more
likely to seek out foreign partners. Columns 8 and 9 further show that firms in regions
providing foreign firms with more preferential policies have higher incentives to seek out
FDI. Table 6 shows that these results are substantially significant. For instance, one
standard deviation increase in the value of "extra financial burden" imposed by the
government would lead the odds for a firm to engage in FDI-seeking behavior to be 1.19
times greater, holding all the other variables constant. We also regress the outcome
variable FOR_INT on all the institutional variables together. Due to the relatively high
correlation between certain institutional variables (see Table 4), even though most
coefficient signs remain in the same direction, their statistical significances are reduced
(Column 10, Table 5). This is probably suggesting one variable has picked up some
effects of another variable.
17 One thing to note is that, simply because the values of a variable can be ordered does not imply that the variable
should be analyzed as ordinal. Besides substantive issues, the appropriateness of an ordered logit model depends on the
parallel regression assumption or the proportional odds assumption (Long and Freese, 2003). Brant tests show that the
assumption of parallel regression is not violated.
18 To avoid multicollinearity, we first employ one institutional index at a time.
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A series of control variables are added for sensitivity testing. Our results remain
robust. For models in Table 7, we add variables measuring firms' foreign linkages. The
international business literature has repeatedly pointed out that FDI helps the local firms'
integration with the global market (Markusen, 2002). Firms with international linkages
have a greater opportunity to be exposed to the business-friendly environment in the
outside world. This might simultaneously cause them to have a negative perception about
local institutions as well a positive propensity to form joint ventures. To control this, we
add four variables to our regression. Both FOR_SALE and FORSUPPLY are firm-level
characteristics measuring whether a firm has foreign supplier relationships or foreign
sales in the year 1994. COAST is a dummy variable indexing whether the firm is located
in a coastal province. Firms in coastal areas are better positioned for integration in the
global market (Krugman, 1992). Their geographical proximity to the major export
destinies such as the United States and Japan reduces the information and transportation
costs (Demurger et al., 2002). We also take into consideration the integration of each
region's economy with the outside world, as measured by the sum of export and import
as percentage of regional GDP. In Table 7", just as expected, each measure of foreign
linkage is positively correlated with firms' joint-venture-seeking behavior. Adding these
variables does not change our findings on institutions in any substantive way. The only
exception is FDI_POLICY, which no longer has statistical significance. We also find that
coastal location per se does not increase firms' joint-venture-seeking behavior in any
statistically significant way. These two results may be caused by the high correlation
(>.70 pair-wise) between the three variables COAST, FDI POLICY and
(IMP+EXP)/GDP. To better test the influence of provincial-level FDI preferential
treatment, we need more fine-tuned data measuring these treatments directly. As
aforementioned, FDI policies in an "Open Economic Zone" do not automatically apply to
regions outside the province's "zones." Firms that are located in the non-zone region of a
province with more zones do not have better opportunities to tap into preferential FDI
policies than firms that are located within a zone in a province with fewer zones. This
argument is confirmed by the columns 9 and 10, which show that firms located in cities
with zone status have a higher propensity to form joint ventures with foreign investors.
19 Due to space limitation, I cut this table off for this version.
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We also take into account individual firm's characteristics. Firms in the same
location may feel environmental pressures differently because of heterogeneity in their
capability. As aforementioned, denied loan access could be a function of the firm's
ranking in the Chinese political pecking order, as well as of idiosyncratic characteristics
such as manager's capability, corporate cash flow, and collateral availability.
Additionally, some entrepreneurs could be more metropolitan in business orientations.
All these factors might influence an entrepreneur's perception of institutional
environment as well as attitudes toward joint venture. To parse these effects, we add a set
of variables, measuring both the entrepreneur's personal characteristics (age, gender, and
education) and the firm's organizational characteristics (firm age, earnings, number of
employees, technological complexity, and sales scope). As Table 8 shows, both
entrepreneurs' educational levels and the size of the firm (measured by the number of
employees) are positively correlated with our outcome variable. Table 8 also shows that,
after controlling for industrial dummies, a region's international linkages and firm level
characteristics (including firms' international linkages), such institutional variables as
governmental expropriations, political and economic discriminations, private status, and
location in economic zones continue to be positively correlated with firms' joint-venture-
seeking behaviors.
We include sector dummies for all the regressions. This helps control industry-
specific differences in firms' penchants for FDI. Sectors vary in terms of their
international linkage, the requirement of scale economy, and technological complexity.
Firms in certain industries may find FDI more important than those in other industries.
Additionally, national industrial policies may vary across sectors. Industries such as those
related to national defense are highly regulated, and foreign-invested enterprises may not
be permitted to enter. This will presumably discourage the local firm from seeking out
foreign investment partners.
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by certain provinces whose
firms are particularly likely to form joint ventures for unobservable reasons, we re-run all
the regressions by dropping all observations from one province each time for the
following regions-Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu (for their coastal location and
large diasporal population); Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin (for their metropolitan status).
But this provincial-level piece-wise deletion does not change our statistical results in any
substantive way, either.
We conduct another robustness test by including the 79 firms that are already
joint ventures into our regression by adding a fourth category, indicating the highest
propensity of joint venture seeking. This only raises the statistical significance of our
institutional findings, for the expanded number of observations and consequentially
gained information efficiency.
We also construct variables that interact institutional constraints (for domestic
firms) with preferential treatment (for foreign invested firms). This allows us to see
whether institutional constraints and preferential treatment enhance each other in shaping
domestic firms' joint-venture-seeking behavior. We find some evidence that the
interaction effect exists between ZONESTATUS and such institutional variables as
financial policy constraint, governmental extra-tax financial burdens, and the private
enterprise status of firms. As shown in Table 10, these interaction terms are significant at
the 0.10 level and of positive signs, suggesting that firms have the strongest motivation to
find a foreign partner if they are located in regions where the institutional constraint to
domestic firms and preferential policies granted to foreign firms are both high. Or, to put
it another way, firms are most likely to seek out joint ventures when the treatment gap
between domestic- and foreign-invested enterprises is the largest. However, caution
needs to be exercised in interpreting this result, as the individual components of the
interaction effect are barely significant. A Wald test also shows that the interaction effect
does not add explanatory power to the regressions, as the value of Chi-squares only
increases slightly. To draw conclusions about the role of policy differential on firm
behaviors, we need fine-tuned and direct measurements of treatment differentials faced
by the two types of firms. However, our data does not allow us to do this, as foreign-
invested firms are barely sampled in the survey and counting the number of "Open
Economic Zones" is a rough proxy for FDI treatment preferences.
We find that some measures of property rights security are not statistically
significant. Across the models, only the measurement of governmental expropriation has
consistently positive and statistically significant correlations with firms' joint-venture-
seeking behaviors. Formal property right legislation and social impingement of property
rights do not seem to influence domestic entrepreneurs' FDI seeking propensity. This not
only reflects the relatively little cross-regional variation in these two variables but also
corroborates well with the argument that extra-tax financial burdens best capture the
"grabbing hand" nature of local governments in China (Li, Meng, and Zhang; 2005).
We also find that financial institutions do not seem to matter. Does this imply that
financial constraints have no impact on Chinese firms' FDI seeking behaviors? Not
necessarily. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the majority of domestic non-state enterprises
answered that they have difficulty in getting external financing and that the pattern is
consistent across regions. The insignificant results in our regressions thus tell that the
lack of variation in financial institutions across regions cannot capture cross-regional
differences in firms' joint-venture-seeking behaviors.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
A joint venture is an organizational form wherein domestic and foreign firms pool
resources together to form a separate corporate entity (Friedman and Kalmanoff, 1961;
Tomlinson 1970). Although one partner's influence may truncate that of the others, no
joint venture can be tailored to serve only one side's interests. Unlike the established
literature, which focuses on the strategic calculations of the foreign firms who supply FDI,
we look at domestic firms who are the candidate receivers of FDI. Although we are not
trying to build a universal theory about FDI flow, our effort does reveal the flip side of
the current theories and underlines the complexity of the phenomenon. We find that,
along with the liability of foreignness, a liability of domesticity may also exist. To attract
FDI, the Chinese government offers foreign investors various policy concessions that are
often exclusive. Being native brings a firm "second-class citizen" status.
Our institutional argument is also consistent with the observation that FDI's
spillover effects in developing countries are often contained within the joint venture
entity but do not extend to neighboring firms (Aitkin and Harrison, 1999). If foreign
equity partnership helps a local firm to operate under friendlier institutions, its higher
productivity may not be a result of knowledge spillover as traditionally understood.
Instead, the productivity gain could be a result of institutional constraint relaxation. Or,
put another way, performance differences between firms with foreign investment partners
and purely domestic firms can be explained by political rather than economic factors.
From this perspective, even when liberalization policies regarding FDI were not directly
extended to domestic firms, they can still partially liberalize the domestic sector, as local
firms may tap into these policies by forming equity partnership with foreign investors.
Competing interpretations of our findings exist. One holds that firms located in
"bad" institutional environments seek out joint ventures to upgrade their capability rather
than dodge institutional constraints. As firms fail to develop by themselves, they would
see outside support via joint venture, an attractive choice. This argument is consistent
with the "spillover" literature, which emphasizes the positive effect of FDI on local firms'
capital flow, technological upgrading, and management development. While this remains
a possible explanation, it is worth noting that we have extensively controlled for firm-
level variables. Thus, if firms' joint-venture-seeking behavior is simply a function of its
capacity, they must do so in a way that is neither observable to us nor captured by our
firm-level controls.
In conclusion, we find consistently strong evidence that the same set of
institutional factors that hinder firm development have been motivating Chinese firms'
FDI-seeking behaviors. Even though substituting contractual arrangement with equity
partnership may not be the most efficient mode of governing a domestic firm's tractions
with a foreign firm, it does help the domestic firm to evade institutional bias. From this
perspective, a large flow of FDI into a developing country may not necessarily indicate
the country's economic health. Rather, it may suggest that the country's growing local
enterprises face considerable institutional constraints that motivate them to seek out
foreign partners through joint ventures.
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Table 1: Investment Environment In China: Domestic Enterprises vs. Foreign
Invested Enterprises
Institutional Environment China Domestic Foreign
Bureaucracy
Senior management time spent in dealing with requirements of
government regulation (%) 18.52 19.11 16.75
Average time firms spent in meetings with tax officials (days) 12.03 12.21 11.7
Consistency/predictability of officials' interpretations of regulations
affecting the firm 66.31 68.43 61.71
Own firm influences laws & regulations that affect firm (%) 3.13 3.33 2.73
Others with cronies influence laws & regulations that affect firm (%) 11.95 13.39 9.13
Corruption
Unofficial payments for typical firm to get things done (% of sales) 1.62 1.77 1.14
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors (%) 38.74 45.93 22.47
Value of gift expected to secure government contract (% of contract) 1.83 1.92 1.56
Pays Bribes to get things done (% firms) 72.57 76.27 60.9
Firms expected to give gifts to get a phone connection (%) 5.51 4.78 6.52
Firms expected to give gifts to get an electrical connection (%) 5.61 6.57 4.35
Firms expected to give gifts to get an operating license (%) 100 100 100
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with labor inspector (%) 27.99 32.44 19.13
Finance
Bank financing (%) 26.42 26.28 27.3
Informal financing (%) 7.58 8.25 3.12
Infrastructure
Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days) 10.45 8.06 15.14
Delay in obtaining a mainline telephone connection (days) 6.02 5.88 6.48
Trade
Average time to clear direct exports through customs (days) 6.16 7.31 4.11
Longest time to clear direct exports through customs (days) 5.78 6.62 5.26
Average time to claim imports from customs (days) 7.6 8.96 5.39
Longest time to claim imports from customs (days) 10.48 12.61 9.37
Firm Ages (years) China Domestic Foreign
15.8 17.31 9.55
Data Source: World Bank Business Environment Survey China (2003).
Table 2: Non-State Enterprise and Joint-venture-seeking behavior in China
Whole Sample FDI-Seeking Firms Not FDI-Seeking Firms
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Owner Age 2839 41.95 1239 41.57 1600 42.24**
Owner Gendert 2861 1.104 1251 1.08 1610 1.12***
Owner Educationtt 2863 4.22 1252 4.30 1611 3.72***
Firm Age 2798 5.67 1226 5.69 1572 5.65
Firm Size t 2791 94.11 1229 144.77 1562 54.25***
# of Technicians 2529 9.48 1177 14.24 1352 5.34***
Tech Ratiott 2515 .138 1168 .136 1347 .139
Net Profitl 2650 1491.14 1155 1446.90 1495 1525.32
Foreign Sale$* 2869 .060 1254 .111 1615 .021***
Foreign Supplierl 2869 .021 1254 .037 1615 .009***
Coastal RegionTS 2869 .627 1254 .658 1615 .602***
Note: Two sample t-test, significance levels of. 1, .05 and .01 are noted by *, **, and ***
FDI-seeking firms refer to firms that are in the process of forming international joint ventures or plan to do it in the next 3 to 5 years.
t Owner Gender: 1 - male; 2 - female.
tt Owner Education: 1 - illiterate; 2 - elementary school; 3 -junior high school; 4 - high school; 5 - professional training school; 6 - advanced
professional training school; 7- college; and 8 - graduate school.
t Firm Size: the number of employees at the end of 1994
tt Tech Ratio: the number of technicians as a percentage of total employees in 1994.
$ Net profit: the firm's net profit in 1994; unit = 1,000 Yuan.
Foreign Sale: 1- the firm had foreign sale in 1994; 0 - the firm had no foreign sale in 1994.
:Foreign Supplier: 1 - the firm had foreign suppliers in 1994; 0 - the firm had no foreign suppliers in 1994.
8t Coastal Region: 1 - the firm was located in a coastal region; 0 - the firm was not located in a coastal region
Table 3: Institutional Environment for Domestic Firms
Province PRLAW A GOVT SOC EXP FINANCE FINANC FDI DISCRIMI
BSERNCE EXPRO ROPRIAT DIFFICU POL DIF POLICY NATION
PRIATE E LTY FICULTY
Anhui 0.43 0.82 0.035 0.68 0.69 0.37 0.43
Beijing 0.27 1.33 0.089 0.63 0.79 0.36 0.49
Fujian 0.4 1.71 0.068 0.61 0.53 2.67 0.31
Gansu 0.38 1.55 0.167 0.81 0.67 0.2 0.39
Guangdong 0.33 2.46 0.075 0.78 0.66 2.84 0.44
Guangxi 0.42 0.52 0.028 0.69 0.39 1.07 0.32
Guizhou 0.59 1.19 0.048 0.77 0.5 0.19 0.33
Hainan 0.2 4.14 0.073 0.92 0.54 1.26 0.34
Hebei 0.49 2.07 0.061 0.76 0.61 1.13 0.4
Heilongjiag 0.5 2.36 0.122 0.76 0.51 0.43 0.45
Henan 0.51 3.22 0.052 0.75 0.59 0.34 0.46
Hubei 0.46 2.32 0.079 0.68 0.53 0.36 0.38
Hunan 0.38 2.63 0.073 0.7 0.59 0.25 0.27
Jiangsu 0.41 2.72 0.047 0.74 0.74 1.45 0.4
Jiangxi 0.5 2.22 0.073 0.71 0.74 0.2 0.25
Jilin 0.38 1.42 0.033 0.54 0.6 0.44 0.34
Liaoning 0.4 1.62 0.057 0.59 0.61 1.15 0.34
Neimenggu 0.35 2.24 0.026 0.81 0.39 0.38 0.42
Ningxia 0.3 2 0.3 0.33 0 0.18 0.5
Shanixi 0.51 1.39 0.046 0.78 0.63 0.2 0.27
Shan3xi 0.4 1.23 0.138 0.65 0.5 0.19 0.35
Shandong 0.48 2.24 0.071 0.86 0.67 1.31 0.39
Shanghai 0.29 1.56 0.022 0.88 0.88 1.49 0.58
Sichuan 0.39 2.33 0.088 0.78 0.74 0.31 0.38
Tianjin 0.3 1.84 0.089 0.65 0.48 1.32 0.41
Xinjiang 0.44 0.79 0.031 0.78 0.71 0.35 0.55
Xizang 0.67 1.67 0 0 n/a* 0.19 0.5
Yunnan 0.28 3.08 0.053 0.78 0.77 0.36 0.56
Zhejiang 0.25 0.87 0.062 0.64 0.71 1.31 0.36
Note: No firm in the region answered
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Table 4: Correlations of Key Variables (N= 2,869)
Variable Names Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FOR INT RANK
PR LAW ABSENCE
GOVT EXPROPRIATE
SOCIAL EXPROPRIATE
FINANCE DIFFICULTY
FINANCE POL CONSTR
FDI POLICY
ZONE STATUS
DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
.437
.485
1.937
1.795
.496
.215
.701
.140
.704 .100
.639 .104
1.244 .886
.566
.391
.783
.496
.068
.412
1.000
.017 1.000
.081 .056 1.000
.004 .014 .158 1.000
.063 -.017 .302 -.076 1.000
.051 .018 .247 .010 .237 1.000
.010 .017 .198 -.016 .336 .095
.105 .012 .123 .043 -.001 -.027
.124 -.005 .212 .002 .126 .433
.022 .003 -.017 -.021 -.001 .003
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
1.000
.173
.217
-.009
1.000
-.047
.007
1.000
.078 1.000
Table 5 --- Institutional Constrains, FDI Policy and Joint-venture-seeking behaviors of Domestic Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Property rights regime weakness
PRLAW ABSENCE
SOCIAL EXPROPRIATE
GOVT EXPROPRIATE
2. Financial constraint
FINANCEDIFFICULTY
FINANCEPOL CONSTRAINT
3. Political pecking orders
DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATEENTERPRISE
4. FDI preferences
FDI_POLICY (provincial level)
ZONESTATUS (city level)
Industry dummies included
.069
(.172)
-.052
(1.334)
.244
(.053)
1.12
(.372)
1.374
(.640)
3.584
(.547)
.460
(.107)
.217
(.042)
.544
(.076)
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations
Wald Chi-square
Degree of freedom
Probability
Brent test (p>chi-square)
2869
124.70
14
<.001
.625
2869
124.20
14
<.001
.623
2869
145.58
14
<.001
.609
2869
133.36
14
<.001
.368
2869
134.38
14
<.001
.527
2869
167.74
14
<.001
.436
2869
143.25
14
<.001
530
2869
195.95
14
<.001
.022
2869
146.72
14
<.001
.620
2869
212.79
20
<.001
**
Note: All regressions are ordinal logit regressions. The dependent variable is FOR_INT_RANK, an ordinal variable on the scale of I to 3 measuring a local lirin S Joint-llentIU c-
seeking behavior. A value of 3 indicates that the firm is in the process of forming a joint venture with foreign investors. A value of 2 indicates that the firm has a plan to form ajoint venture with foreign investors in the next three to five years. A value of I indicates that the firm has no plan or does not want to form a joint venture with foreign investors
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Institutional Variables
.035
(.175)
-.435
( 1.343)
.161
(.058)
.008
(.441)
-.259
(.854)
2.144
(.674)
.412
(.109)
.124
(.054)
.385
(.080)
YES
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --------------------------------------'
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. ** This calculation puts high demand on memory. The author allocated 1 gigabyte memory (the maximum allowed by his
computer) for the STATA program and find the matsize is still too small..
Table 6: Probability of Engagement in Joint-venture-seeking behaviors:
Independent Variables Raw Coefficient
Protection of Rights:
PRLAW ABSENCE .069
SOC EXPRORPIRATE -.052
GOVT EXPROPRIATE .244
Financial Constraints:
FINANCE DIFF 1.122
FINANCE POL CONSTRAINT 1.374
Discriminations:
DISCRIMINATE 3.585
PRIVATEENTERPRISE .460
Preferential Policies to FDI:
FDI POLICY
ZONESTATUS
.217
.544
p-value Odds Ratio Change I
.685
.462
.000
.003
.032
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.072
.949
1.276
3.071
3.952
36.037
1.583
1.242
1.723
Odds Ratio Change II
1.015
.999
1.186
1.119
1.082
1.278
1.183
1.212
1.308
Note: * Odds ratio change I refers to factor change in odds for unit increase in independent variable.
** Odds ratio change II refers to change in odds ratio for standard deviation increase in independent variables.
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Table 7 --- Institutions, International Linkages and Joint Venture-Seeking Behaviors of Domestic Firms
Institutional Variables
1. Property rights regime weakness
PRLAW ABSENCE
SOCIAL EXPROPRIATE
GOVT EXPROPRIATE
2. Financial constraint
FINANCE DIFFICULTY
FINANCEPOL CONSTRAINT
3. Political pecking orders
DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
4. FDI preferences
FDIPOLICY
ZONESTATUS
5. International linkages
FOR SALE
FORSUPPLY
COAST
(IMPORT+EXPORT)/GDP
Industry dummies included
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
.032
(.174)
-1.239
(1.401)
.204
(.055)
.658
(.434)
2.413
(.760)
3.277
(.679)
.486
(.111)
1.460
(.157)
.844
(.258)
.005
(.078)
4.073
(.906)
YES
1.464
(.155)
.856
(.258)
-.002
(.088)
4.109
(.906)
YES
1.491
(.155)
.787
(.259)
-.006
(.088)
3.279
(.921)
YES
1.463
(.155)
.798
(.259)
.045
(.079)
3.414
(.986)
YES
1.460
(.155)
.850
(.258)
.137
(.086)
3.900
(.904)
YES
1.463
(.155)
.805
(.260)
.143
(.078)
1.824
(1.008)
YES
1.454
(.157)
.823
(.274)
.007
(.087)
4.506
(.952)
YES
.031
(.099)
1.445
(.158)
.770
(.288)
-.035
(.129)
3.664
(1.501)
YES
.014
(.178)
-.970
(1.339)
.188
(.059)
.008
(.502)
-.445
(.858)
2.193
(.690)
.388
(.110)
.075
(.083)
.470 .389
(.081) (.080)
1.472
(.161)
.679
(.290)
-.017
(.078)
3.106
(.948)
YES
1.481
(.161)
.645
(.283)
-.029
(.138)
2.350
(1.702)
YES
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Number of observations 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862 2862
Wald Chi-square 261.89 265.11 277.86 266.62 274.35 267.52 242.81 227.67 262.23 291.70
Degree of freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 26
Probability <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
Brent test (p>Chi-square) .430 .394 .388 .178 .380 .277 .316 .113 .361
Note: All regressions are ologit regressions. The dependent variable is FOR INT RANK, an ordinal variable on the scale of 1 to 3 measuring a local firm's joint venture seeking
behavior. A value of 3 indicates that the firm is in the process of forming a joint venture with foreign investors. A value of 2 indicates that the firm has a plan to form a joint
venture with foreign investors in the next three to five years. A value of 1 indicates that the firm has no plan or does not want to form a joint venture with foreign investors.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Table 8 --- Institutional Constrains, Firm Characteristics and Joint-venture-seeking behaviors of Domestic Firms
Institutional Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1. Property rights regime weakness
PR LAW ABSENCE
SOCIAL EXPROPRIATION
GOVT EXPROPRIATION
2. Financial constraint
LOAN DIFFICULTY
CRDTPOLCONSTRAINT
3. Political pecking orders
DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
4. FDI preferences
FDI POLICY
ZONE STATUS
5. Firm Owner Characteristics
AGE
-.120
(207)
-.711
(1.654)
.124
(.064)
.769
(.510)
1.428
(.887)
2.305
(.794)
-.005
(.005)
-.089
(.162)
MALE
-.005
(.005)
-.099
(.160)
-.005
(.005)
-.104
(.160)
-.004
(.005)
-.101
(.160)
-.005
(.005)
-.105
(.160)
-.005
(.005)
-.110
(160)
- 016
( 789)
-.761
(1.662)
.133
(.073)
.411
(.702)
-.860
(1.419)
.391
(.134)
0.005
(.005)
-.095
(.159)
.184
(.115)
-.004
(.005)
-.099
(160)
2.240
(1.170)
.349
(.132)
.129
(.144)
.388 .252
(.094) (.097)
-.005
(.005)
-.097
(.160)
-.005
(.011)
-.072
(.170)
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EDUCATION LEVEL
6. Firm characteristics
FIRM AGE
TECHNOLOGY LEVEL
FIRM SIZE
PROFITLEVEL
Industry dummies included
International linkages included
.235 .235 .233 .234 .232 .229 .235 .236 .230 .223
(.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.028)
.002 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .005 .001 .003 .005
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
.347 .368 .353 .369 .353 .338 .388 .372 .345 .360
(.226) (.225) (.226) (.225) (.226) (.226) (.227) (.225) (.227) (.231)
.521 .528 .531 .531 .527 .530 .526 .531 .524 .532
(.042) (.042) (.042) (042) (.042) (042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (044)
.003 .003 .003 .002 .002 .003 .004 .003 .002 .002
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007)
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
Number of observations 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232
Wald Chi-square 430.88 450.84 443.08 442.40 441.87 443.09 438.83 443.13 444.82 433.71
Degree of freedom 25 25 25 25 25 25 26 26 26 33
Probability <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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Table 9 --- Institutional Environment Gap and Joint-venture-seeking behaviors of Domestic Firms
Institutional Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1. Property rights regime weakness
PR LAW ABSENCE
SOCIAL EXPROPRIATION
GOVT EXPROPRIATION
2. Financial constraint
FINANCEDIFFICULTY
-.108 -.418
(.212) (.339)
-.843
(1.895) (2.525)
-1.683
.111 .071
(.064) (.073)
.662 .489
(.505) (.514)
1.337
(.724) (.905)
FINANCEPOLCONSTRAINT
3. Political pecking orders
DISCRIMINATION
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
4. FDI preferences
ZONE STATUS
5. Interaction effects
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
x ZONE STATUS
Industry dummies included
International linkages included
Firm owner characteristics included
Firm characteristics
.796
2.302 2.029
(.758) (.899)
.345 .243
(.130) (.147)
.311 .290 .388 .322 .316 .095 .319 .113 .324 .084 .288. .234 255 .157
(.099) (.100) (.104) (.153) (.099) (.124) (.098) (.157) (.098) (.121) (.093) (.127) (.092) (.111)
YES
YES
YES
YES
.505
(.432)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
1.240
(2.151)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
.114
(.061)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
.363
(.215)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
.893
(.391)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
.211
(.337)
YES
YES
YES
YES
108
.191
(.118)
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
------------------------------------------------------------------- ------ - --- -------------- ------
Number of observations 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232
Wald Chi-square 434.06 433.45 456.82 457.15 445.51 448.31 445.34 446.53 444.67 444.82 446.36 446.26 446.36 446.46
Degree of freedom 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27 26 27
Probability <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
Table 10: Correlation of Constructed Interaction Terms
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. FDI x PR LAW ABSENCE 1.000
2. FDI x SOC EXPROPRIATE .908 1.000
3. FDI x GOVT EXPROPRIATE .906 .921 1.000
4. FDI x FINANCE DIFF .938 .941 .930 1.000
5. FDI x FIN POL CONS .916 .909 .916 .963 1.000
6. FDI x DISCRIMINATE .894 .923 .923 .961 .986 1.000
7. FDI x PRIVATE .731 .706 .681 .749 .738 .725 1.000
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Chapter Three
THE PERPETUATION OF OBESITY: BUREAUCRACY AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER MARKET TRANSITION
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Prior research in western countries has suggested that work experience in
bureaucratic organizations has a detrimental effect on individuals' growth of
entrepreneurial competence. However, research focusing on developing country context
consistently finds that bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs convert their political powers
into economic advantages. This paper reconciles these two perspectives, arguing that
bureaucratic legacy may serve as a double-edged sword to entrepreneurship: On the one
hand, it positions entrepreneurs well to access state controlled resources; on the other
hand, it transfers the organizational blueprints of the state sector into startups and
constrains the latter from utilizing resources efficiently. Analysis of a nationally
representative survey of private entrepreneurs in China finds supports for these
arguments.
INTRODUCTION
New organizations emerge directly or indirectly from established ones (Freeman,
1986). While new ventures advance technologies, redefine products and services, and in
some cases create entirely new industries (Schumpeter, 1934), their emergence and
development are greatly shaped by the social structure that is defined by the existing
organizations (Aldrich, 1992; Sorenson and Audia, 2000). As Freeman (1986:39)
describes, "Organizations create their own competition by providing the skills and
background that provide credibility for the entrepreneur. They provide the knowledge of
opportunity by placing that person in a position to know about unserved or badly served
markets." Career history serves as a natural conceptual linkage between individuals'
entrepreneurial behaviors and the existing organizations. Studies have suggested that
prior employers influence individuals' recognition of entrepreneurial opportunities
(Roberts, 1991, pp. 100-123; Shane, 2000), their willingness to embrace new ventures
(Stuart and Ding, 2006; Sorensen, 2007), and eventually their performance and
commitment as entrepreneurs (Burton, Beckman and Sorensen, 2002; Sorensen and
Philips, 2008).
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While a wealth of workplace characteristics are potentially relevant to individuals'
transition into entrepreneurship, the recent literature has particularly focused on how
bureaucracy and bureaucratization influences the development of entrepreneurial
competence (Sorensen, 2007; Sorensen and Philips, 2008; Ozcan and Reichstein, 2009).
The core features of bureaucratic organization- specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a
system of rules, and impersonality - are generally perceived to be incompatible with the
creation of dynamic and viable new ventures. First, bureaucracies influence the attitudes
and mental dispositions of their employees in ways that make them less likely to make
initiatives or embrace risks (Sorensen 2007); Second, work in bureaucracies hinder the
development of skills necessary for successful entrepreneurship, as task specialization
insulates employees from learning a wide range of knowledge that is required for
entrepreneurship (Sorensen 2007; Sorensen and Philips 2008); Finally, bureaucracies
direct employee attentions towards internal tasks and governmental regulators and isolate
them from interacting with outside (market) players to build broad social networks
(Gompers et al., 2002; Ozcan and Reichstein, 2009) . As Sorenson (2007) summarizes,
"The realities of bureaucratic life are fundamentally incompatible with the development
of entrepreneurial initiative".
While the literature has generated enormous evidence that bureaucracy is
detrimental to individual's development of entrepreneurial capability, there are also good
reasons to believe that work experience in bureaucratic organizations may generate
certain benefits for entrepreneurial endeavors. Otherwise, one has to wonder why many
people who work in bureaucratic organizations such as a large and established private
sector firm like IBM or a public sector organization like the all-powerful governmental
agencies in China leave to set up their own ventures. Indeed, an impressive amount of
evidence has been generated suggesting that bureaucratic experience can provide
entrepreneurs with competitive advantages in the market place, helping them access key
external resources and pursuing strategies with high return prospects. For instance,
Burton, Sorensen and Beckman (2002) find that large and established organizations can
be "entrepreneurially prominent" and their spinoffs face lower hurdles in receiving
venture capital financing. In addition, many studies have suggested that endorsement
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from large and established organizations instantly boost startup firms' chance of survival
and opportunity of growth (Stuart et al. 1999; Higgins and Gulati, 2001; Baum and
Silverman, 2004). Among these established organizations, the most bureaucratic is the
state (Wilson, 1989) that has the regulative power in the market, defining the
"appropriateness" of organizational behaviors (Scott, 1995) and exercising coercive
power to punish deviants (North, 1990). Studies have found connections with the state
help young organizations gain legitimacy and access key external resources (Baum and
Oliver, 1991; Siegel, 2007). Studies in the context of developing countries have
particularly emphasized the impact of state on firm competitiveness through the
allocation of state contracts, license and the provision of finance (Roy, 1981; Siegel, 2007;
Fan, 2007). As individuals rarely sever connections with their former colleagues when
leaving their former employers, and personal ties help build trust and alliance formation
(Gulati, 1995), there are no reasons to completely rule out that individuals with
bureaucratic legacies may have certain advantages when setting up their own firms.
While bureaucracy may have both positive and negative effects on
entrepreneurship, the prior literature has categorically defined bureaucracy as either being
good or bad for entrepreneurial endeavors and rarely explored how bureaucracy may
influence individuals' development of entrepreneurial competence both positively and
negatively. 20 This study makes the first attempt to integrate these seemingly incompatible
perspectives. Rather than being all of one piece, a bureaucratic organization is a career
location with a multiplicity of factors influencing entrepreneurial opportunity and
competence. From this perspective, bureaucracy can have very different implications for
individuals' willingness to embrace new ventures, their commitment as entrepreneurs,
and their ventures' performance in terms of access and utilization of resources. While
bureaucracy constrains people from developing entrepreneurial mindset and skills
(Sorensen, 2007; Sorensen and Philips, 2008), this does not necessarily deny that
20 This is not to deny that some of the most sophisticated studies acknowledge the duality. Sorensen (2002),
for instance, suggests bureaucratic organizations may provide individuals with entrepreneurial
opportunities. As large and established organizations often fail to commercialize technologies that are
developed in house, leaving opportunities for entrepreneurial employees to set up outside ventures to
explore these technologies (Gompers et al. 2005).
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bureaucracy can help entrepreneurs gain legitimacy and access external resources (Baum
and Oliver, 1991; Malesky and Taussig, 2008).
In this study, I argue that bureaucracy presents entrepreneurs with a double-edged
sword: On the one hand, affiliation with established players helps firms build legitimacy
and access external resources. Given their size and prominence, bureaucratic
organizations tend to occupy central positions within an organizational ecosystem.
Affiliation with such organizations may serve as a social capital, helping certify
entrepreneurs as legitimate players and connect them directly or indirectly to key
resource holders that might otherwise have hesitate to collaborate with these
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, bureaucratic work environment exposes employees to
inefficient organizational routines, and influence employees to learn sluggish
organizational culture. When these factors are transferred to a new organization through
employee turnover, the progeny organization suffers in performance. Thus, the issue is
not to measure the net positive or negative effects of bureaucracy but rather the
mechanisms that produce these negative and positive effects and to highlight the role of
institutional context.
In addressing how a bureaucratic legacy influences entrepreneurship, I study the
access and utilization of financial capital of Chinese entrepreneurs, with a particular
focus on the role of entrepreneurs' work experience in the public sector such as
governmental agencies and state owned enterprises. This is a fortuitous setting for several
reasons. First, the public sector helps build a tight and direct linkage between
bureaucracy and entrepreneurship. An organization's level of bureaucratization is not
directly observable (Sorensen 2007:395). While organizational characteristics such as
firm size and age have well-established implications for the degree of bureaucratization
(Blau and Schoenherr 1971; Dobrev and Barnett 2005; Sorensen 2007), these
characteristics may well capture other mechanisms that may well affect individual rate
and success of entrepreneurial activity (Freeman et al. 1983; Aldrich and Auster 1986).
As the public sector is "the most bureaucratic among all bureaucratic organizations"
(Wilson, 1989), the focus of public sector work experience helps to spotlight the staying
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power of bureaucratic organizational style. Second, finance is among the most crucial
resources that organizations need for survival and growth. Building a linkage between an
entrepreneur's bureaucratic legacy and his access and utilization of financial capital helps
understand how the social structure and organizational routines defined by the established
organizations influence the dynamics of new organizations. Third, China as a setting
extends the literature to transitional economies, an institutional environment different
from the western countries. Past studies have mainly focused on stable and developed
economies like Denmark and the United States. Few studies have explored how
bureaucratic work experience may influence entrepreneurship under different institutional
contexts. Given that institutions play the most important role in moderating the way
organizations function and individuals behave (North, 1990), such an effort is needed in
order to better understand the boundary conditions of various theories (Bian, 1993). As a
former socialist country, China shares many characteristics with other transition
economies in the world. While the nation strives to build a market-based economy, the
state continues to play an important role in the process of resource allocation. Many
studies have shown that firm owners who used to work in the state sector enjoyed great
advantages over their counterpart who did not have such experiences (Zhou, 2000;
Walder, 2002). However, none of the previous research has revealed how bureaucratic
experiences may have detrimental effects on entrepreneurial ventures.
This study empirically tests the relationship between bureaucracy and
entrepreneurship using a nationally representative survey of private enterprises in China.
It finds that bureaucratic work experience influences entrepreneurial competence in a
complex way. Compared with their counterparts without work experience in the public
sector, bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are advantaged in obtaining resources,
particularly state controlled resources such as bank credits. However, this advantage is
accompanied by a detrimental effect. Partly due to their persisting bureaucratic legacy,
entrepreneurs from the public sector tend to utilize resources less efficiently and their
ventures suffer from lower productivity than those founded by people without such
legacy. I also find weak evidences that entrepreneurs out of China's quasi-public,
collective sector tend to perform well on both dimensions, as the collective sector not
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only helps these entrepreneurs to develop connections with the state, but also exposes
them to the discipline of market competition and better organizational blueprints. Thus,
this paper offers a unique sociological approach that allows us to explore how some
individuals, due to their location in the social structure of existing organization, are better
able to explore entrepreneurial opportunities through access to key external resources, but
are constrained in efficiently utilizing these resources due to the transfer of organizational
mindset and routines that are detrimental to entrepreneurial endeavors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on
the role of bureaucracy to develop theoretical predictions regarding how public sector
work experience influences entrepreneurial performances. Section III describes the
empirical setting and data, and Section IV presents the empirical analysis. I use a variety
of empirical methods to test the theory, in order to ensure the robustness of the statistical
results. The last section of the paper discusses the empirical results and explores how the
conclusions drawn from the China may be generalized to other countries.
BUREAUCRACY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
New organizations face at least two hurdles to survive and their prior
organizational affiliation influences their capability to overcome these hurdles. On the
one hand, the start of a new venture requires the mobilization of substantial array of
social and material resources (Stinchcombe, 1965). Endowed with little legitimacy and
track record of performance (Aldrich and Auster, 1986), new ventures have to seek the
endorsement of other organizations for resources directly or indirectly (Stuart et al.,
1997). These endorsement opportunities are differently available to individuals, as they
occupy different positions in the social structure (Burt, 1992), that to a great extent is
determined by the individual's career history, particularly his or her affiliation with
different employers (Burton et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 2005). On the other hand, new
organizations generally require that a person learn new roles, settle on operating
procedures and create a culture in order to efficiently utilize the assembled resources
(Stinchcombe, 1965). High costs are associated with inventing roles and structuring
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relations in order to deliver reliable performances. Organizational routines, role
relationships and corporate culture are often tacit knowledge that is difficult for an
outsider to replicate (Nelson and Winter, 1985). Instead, they are embodied in employees
(McKelvey, 1982) and are transferred across organizations through employee turnovers
(Philips, 2002). The following section elaborates on how bureaucratic work experience
may influence individuals' development of entrepreneurial competence.
CAREER HISTORY AND RESOURCE ACCESS
Organizations, whether established or startup, cover only part of their value chain
and depends critically on their environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). New
organizations are particularly truncated in their resource endowment. Important resource
and informational benefits are affiliated with prominent organizations. First, these
organizations often hold key resources such as distribution, manufacturing, marketing
and financial capital that startups need to commercialize their technologies and services.
One key survival strategy for startups is to build strategic alliance with the big and
established organizations. Such an alliance serves as an inter-organizational endorsement
that can instantly improve the economic prospects of an entrepreneurial firm (Stuart et al.,
1997). In comparison with startups, public sector organizations are often endowed with
slack resource. Encountering difficulties in innovating by themselves, these organizations
often sponsor outside R&D activities in hope of harvesting part of the benefits (Arora and
Gambardella, 1990). Work experience in these established organizations should provide
entrepreneurs with an advantage in building alliances with these organizations (Gulati,
1995), as familiarity facilitates information transfer and trust building between potential
partners and helps them to establish mutually beneficial relationships (Uzzi, 1996). For
instance, Gulati and Higgins (2003) find that a startup is most likely to gain endorsement
from its upward or downward organizations when its top management team members
worked in these organizations (Gulati and Higgins, 2003). Hallen (2008) also finds that
relationships developed by entrepreneurs during their prior employment period helps
startups to form connections with prominent organizations, particularly when these
startups have only limited track records of performance.
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Second, large and established organizations having ties with a firm can make
referrals on behalf of the focal firm to third parties that are in search of strategic alliances
to exploit/ explore entrepreneurial opportunities. Potential partners are reluctant to put
their reputation, capital, or other resources at risk in a startup, whose financial prospects
and longevity are often highly uncertain (Podolny, 2001). Contacts with established
players are conducive to the mobilization of external resources from third parties since
those very contacts signal positive assessments regarding the startup's future prospects
(Stuart et al., 1999). Sociologists have long maintained that status can be transferred, as
individual status is in part constructed from the identities of the parties with which he
associates (Blau, 1964). Naturally, individuals benefit from association with prominent
actors whose legitimacy is beyond doubt (Goode, 1978). Public sector organizations such
as the state can be a key player defining a new venture's legitimacy. Rather than simply
another bureaucratically administrated structure, the state has "special power and
prerogatives" to regulate other players in the market, defining the "appropriateness" of
organizational behaviors (Scott, 1995), and exercising coercive power to punish deviants
(North, 1990). Bureaucratic experience helps entrepreneurs boost their legitimacy in the
eyes of the state regulator, as enterprises built by former bureaucrats are more likely to be
perceived with a higher level of "publicness" through their external linkages with
political authority. Baum and Oliver (1991) examine the impact of institutional linkages
on the failure of child care service organizations in Metropolitan Toronto between 1971
and 1987. They show that organizations with institutional linkages to the state exhibit a
significant survival advantage and that the advantage increases with the intensity of
competition.
The role of bureaucratic legacy could be particularly strong in developing
countries, as the state plays a central role in these economies and the public sector there
controls a much higher percentage of economic resources than their western counterparts.
I will elaborate on this point when visiting the Chinese case.
CAREER EXPERIENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMPRINTING
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New firms need to build an organizational structure to support the execution of
strategies and utilization of assembled resources. These structures reside within
organizations and compose the most idiosyncratic resources that individual firms possess.
Their attributes significantly affect firms' competitive advantages and, by implication,
their performances (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1985). New organizations,
however, generally involve new roles and routines that have to be learned and refined
(Stinchcombe, 1965). An entrepreneur's career history greatly shapes this learning
process and thus the establishment and evolution of new firms' organizational structures
(Philips, 2002; Burton and Beckman, 2007). As organizational routines and cultural
attitudes are embodied in an organization's employees, when individuals leave existing
organizations to found new organizations, they transfer some of the parent organization's
routines to the progeny organization (McKelvey, 1982). As a result, the structure and
culture of progeny organizations are in part determined by the structure and culture of
their "parent" organizations (Philips, 2002). To the extent we understand the source of a
founder's routines, we are better able to understand the emergence and diversity of
organizational blueprints (Carroll, 1993).
Career experiences in the public sector may negatively influence an
entrepreneur's capability to exploit market opportunities in several ways. First, public
sector norms and modes of reasoning limit the development of entrepreneurial mindsets.
Entrepreneurs usually create and run their ventures to develop a market niche with new
products, services and/or substitute established players with better quality and cheaper
price. This process of "creative destruction" requires an entrepreneurial orientation that
encourages innovativeness, risk-taking propensity and proactiveness (Schumpeter, 1947;
Miller, 1983). Unfortunately, none of these characteristics is encouraged in bureaucratic
organizations (Sorensen, 2007). For instance, the public sector is featured not only with a
culture that emphasizes systematic rules and procedures, but also institutionalized
methods of organizing social conduct. All these features consequentially suppress the
voices that challenge organizational norms and beliefs (Wilson, 1989). Rather than being
fostered in an entrepreneurial environment where creativity and experimentation are
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encouraged, employees in public organizations are "expected to identify strongly with
their work roles and be 'conformist,' 'cohesive,' and 'collectivist"' (Ozcan and
Reichstein, 2009: 607). As a result, they gradually feel that deference of problem solving
and responsibility for decisions to supervisors is acceptable, even though these
individuals initially joined the public sector to "make a change in the world". This shift is
particularly promoted by these organizations' rigid procedural norms and reward systems
that seek stability and punish failed initiatives (Perry and Porter 1982; Wilson, 1989).
Thus, the longer an individual stays in the organization, the further these structural forces
will distance him from the frame of mind required to become an entrepreneur.
Second, the absence of (intense) competition prevents public sector organizations
from developing organizational routines that suit market competition. Low exposures to
competition shelter employees from external labor market competition and lock them into
passive and mechanistic patterns of behavior. Firms are most likely to engage in a search
for ways to improve performance when facing competition. Learning can be a self-
reinforcing process known in evolution theory as the "Red Queen": An organization's
competitive strength triggers learning in its rivals, "consequentially making them stronger
competitors and so again triggering learning by the first organization" (Barnett and
Hansen, 1996: 139). Even though political constituencies add pressures to public sector
organizations, political control over firms "cannot provide the pervasive, if not always
coercive, set of value signals and incentives that is provided by consumer sovereignty in
the market sectors" (Nelson and Winter, 1982:270). As "the best of all monopoly profits
is a quiet life" (Hicks, 1935:8), the lack of business rivalry softens public sector
organizations, allowing them to avoid conflict-creating decisions in favor of slightly
suboptimal performances. This lack of vigor permeates the entire public sector,
engendering tangible bureaucratic distortions and constrains them from adopting the best
organizational practices.
Third, political environment shapes a firm's organizational routine and strategic
orientation. In the public sector, the higher level of a governmental agency oversees the
performance of an organization. In the case of state owned enterprises, particularly under
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a planned economy, state agencies set prices, certify expansion projects, determine what
to produce, and what costs may be passed through to customers, and involve themselves
in numerous other decisions that are made autonomously by firms in the private sector.
So fundamental is the influence of higher authority on the performance and reward of
employees in the public sector, public sector organizations are often guilty of maintaining
a focus on regulators and are bureaucratically burdened. "When organizations are
regulated by the state, the economic environment diminishes in importance as the
importance of the political and administrative environment increases. Both attention and
behavior shift accordingly. The decisions of customers become less important than the
decisions of lawmakers and government agents" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1979: 203). Not
surprisingly, public sector organizations often direct their attention to regulators and other
political actors, rather than seeking information about the market and customers. Across
time, this perspective is embedded within a "public sector"-linked firm and its routines.
The organizations start to ignore the environment, erecting elaborate and rigid "castles"
to buffer themselves from customer demand (Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck, 1976).
Making things worse, public sector organizations face pressures from a variety of
political constituencies. Unlike the tangible and relatively specific goals of business
organizations, public organizations operate in a political environment and lack goal
crispness (Buchanan, 1975). One special feature of public sector organization is the
multiplicity of dimensions - "of tasks, of stakeholders and their often conflicting interests
about the ends and the means, and of the tiers of management and front-line workers"
(Dixit 2002:697). Striving to satisfy the diffuse and conflicting demands from external
interests, public organizations have burdens other than providing best services that can be
evaluated by clearly defined criteria. For solutions like competition or performance-based
incentives, they may have beneficial effects in some dimensions or some principals, but
generate dysfunctional reactions in other dimensions or from other principals. The
problems of "creating performance criteria and implementing evaluation schemes are
complex and difficult" (Perry and Porter, 1982: 90-91). As a result, public organizations
are constrained from developing routines that are efficient under market condition.
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In summary, compared with the market sector, public organizations tend to
operate in an environment where competition is discouraged, organizational behaviors
are politically regulated, and performance evaluation standards are fuzzy. All these
properties of bureaucratic organizations are inimical to the cultivation of organizational
culture and routines that are compatible with market completion. When the skills and
know-how of the parent organization can be brought to bear on the progeny, public sector
experience should prepare an entrepreneur less well for growing the new ventures.
Chandler (1996) examines how the past experiences of founders affect the success of new
ventures. He finds that new venture performance improves to the extent that there is
similarity between the task environment of the new venture and the task environment
faced by entrepreneur in his or her previous job. Similarly, performance tends to improve
to the extent that the skills required in the new venture are similar to those previously
developed.
CADRE AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CHINA
The fate of private entrepreneurship has changed dramatically over the past three
decades in China (Huang, 2008). Prior to market reform, private entrepreneurship had
been actively suppressed by the state, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. While
an underground economy survived in the rural area and operated in the shadow of the
collectivized agriculture, in cities private entrepreneurship had been all but eradicated by
the late Maoist era (Whyte and Parish, 1984).
Since Deng Xiaoping opened up the economy, private entrepreneurship started to
flourish at a surprising speed, "as if as if a strange army appeared suddenly from
nowhere". The rise of private entrepreneurship in China has opened up mobility channels
both for entrepreneurs and for their employees, beyond the reach of the socialist state. As
Szelenyi and Kostello (1996) pointed out, the rapidly expanding market sector created
new opportunities, and those who were able to take advantage of the expanded new
opportunities became the winners. However, people who were able to do so varied under
different circumstances. In the early stage of the reform when participation in the market
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was highly risky and required little skill, most self-employed entrepreneurs came from
the lower tiers of the social hierarchy (Wu, 2006). As private economic activities became
legal and market competition played a greater role in economic operations, people with
more human capital and political capital began to be involved in business activities. Some
political elites started to convert their political privileges into new economic advantages.
After 1992, increasing numbers of government employees quit their government posts to
enter the private sector. This exodus from the government and government-controlled
institutions to private firms has been vividly dubbed as 'plunge into the sea'. These new
entrants to the thriving private sector have become an important contingent of what are
popularly known as the 'red capitalists' in China, that is, entrepreneurs with close
personal and political ties to the Communist Party (Dickson, 2003).
A number of factors contributed to the defection of government staff and
managers of state-owned enterprises to the private sector after 1992. Deng Xiaoping's
Southern Tour of 1992 represented a critical turnaround in the Party's policy toward the
development of private enterprises, and since then restrictions on private ownership have
been gradually relaxed and the political and economic environment has become friendlier
to private enterprises. The emergence and promising prospect of private business thus
became increasingly attractive to government-sector workers. A more important reason
for the emergence of cadre-turned -entrepreneurs is that their previous work experience in
the government or state-owned enterprises allowed them to establish important
connections with key party and government officials before starting their own firms.
Given the adverse political and economic environment, bureaucratic experiences have
become a valuable political tool for private entrepreneurs. Indeed, to strengthen links
with the Party, an increasing number of private firms have established Party branches and
regularly undertake party activities (Ma and Parish, 2006).
Former bureaucrats in China enjoy many advantages over entrepreneurs with
work experience in the private sector only. One defining feature of transitional economies
like China is the underdevelopment of market supporting institutions such as functional
banking system and well respected property right regime. In many of these countries, the
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state is still playing an active role in credit allocation and politically connected actors are
heavily favored. Even in Eastern European countries where big-bang approaches were
adopted in market creation, socialist legacy continued to persist in the economy (Stark,
1990), allowing members of the administrative elite to gradually convert their positional
power into economic might (Rona-Tas, 1994). This may take the form of using personal
contacts and information acquired through jobs in the state bureaucracy for brokerage
activities, to subcontract to small private firms in which managers of state enterprises had
a personal interest, and to convert de facto use and income rights of state enterprises into
more de jure alienable rights during State-Owned-Enterprise (SOE) privatization.
Moreover, in these countries, even though private enterprises have gradually
gained political and constitutional recognition, private entrepreneurs continue to deal
with hostility and social prejudice on the part of cadres and the public in general. They
are often regarded as dubious, ignoble, and even despicable (Huang, 2003). As a result,
they are vulnerable to the prey of the "grabbing hand of the state" and are reluctant to
reinvest their profit to grow their firms (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002).
However, even in the most predatory state, the government does not discriminate against
all enterprises to the same extent. Firms with political connections in the government tend
to be politically favored and thus have better property rights protection (Huang, 2003;
Siegel, 2005). As a result, they are more likely to invest to harvest the benefits of scale
economy.
Bureaucratic experience may particularly help entrepreneurs to access bank
credits. While leaving the public sector for private enterprises, these entrepreneurs
nevertheless keep their personal relationships with former colleagues and work contacts
and these bonds enable them to access to state controlled resources such as bank credits.
State banks are highly regulated in China; the central government and especially the local
governments at various levels actively interfere with the functioning of the capital market
by directing and encouraging some bank loans while discouraging or even prohibiting
others (Boyreau-Debray and Wei, 2004). Outside the banking sector, the capital market is
not well-developed in proportion to the size of the economy (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2008).
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While alternative, informal financial mechanisms exist, it is usually costly for
entrepreneurs to rely on such "back alley banking" to grow their firms (Tsai, 2004;
Passas, 1999). Even though firms in rapidly growing areas may be more able to finance
activities from retained earnings, China's low official interest rates make loan financing
highly desirable. Thus, firms which have better access to bank loans will have a natural
competitive advantage in the market.
Along with their advantages in accessing state controlled resources, bureaucrats-
turned- entrepreneurs may also suffer from their bureaucratic legacy. The detrimental
effects against entrepreneurship in the public sector often take their worst forms in former
socialist economies. The problems of lack of market competition and political regulation
are particularly salient for bureaucrats in the former socialist economies. In the market
system, firms have to search markets for information on which produced are demanded
and decide which demand they are best able to fulfill. The socialist experience has
equipped firms with little prior knowledge that would allow them to adequately interpret
the information acquired to make optimal decisions on opportunities to pursue. In the
state sector, economic resources are allocated primarily according to central plans and
bureaucratic controls and the basis for reward is political loyalty rather than economic
productivity (Szelenyi, 1983). Naturally, firms aim to fulfill the production requirement
from the authority above, rather than paying attention to demand in the market.
A key feature of SOEs in emerging economies is the soft budget constraint, which
refers to the phenomenon that state agencies will bail SOEs out when they run into
financial troubles (Kornai, 1992). Financial performance is not emphasized under the
socialist economic system, fulfillment of the central economic plan, often measured in
production quantity, is an important criteria evaluating managerial capability (Gregory
and Stuart, 1981). As the planned system operates deficiently and the socialist economies
face a chronic shortage of production factors, the pressure to meet the production plan
forces SOE managers to hoard everything, from raw materials to financial capital and
from machineries to human resources (Conyngham, 1982). Put it another way, "this is a
system of 'just-in-case' management, as opposed to the lean, 'just-in-time' management
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now practiced throughout the West. Such a 'just-in-case' system naturally ends up with a
large amount of slack" (Tan and Peng, 2003: 1253).
Resource slack often has detrimental effects on SOEs under a centrally planned
economy. While resource slack provides firms with opportunities to explore innovative
strategies to improve performances in a market economy (Singh, 1986), SOEs in the
socialist system have strong incentives to accumulate rather than absorbing resource
slack (Kornai, 1992). A manager whose firm operates efficiently and produces at a level
above the planned quantity will receive an "updated" and higher production target in the
subsequent year. Given the chronic shortage of production factors in the socialist
economy, this will naturally put the manager under the risk of negative evaluation.
Chronically, these SOEs build organizational routines to facilitate the accumulation and
under-utilization of resources to buffer themselves from the pressure of plan targets from
higher authorities.
Even though market liberalization has gradually introduced competition to the
state owned enterprises, these firms continue to suffer from soft-budget constraints
(Steinfeld, 1998). Their external operating environment, while sluggish, was predictable
and controlled. Marketing, sales, competitive pricing and customer satisfaction were
simply not organizational priorities. Risk taking was strongly discouraged and managers
were expected to follow party doctrine in terms of their organizational leadership and
human resource practices. Now, business leaders in state owned enterprises find
themselves being forced to compete in a competitive, market driven environment. These
business leaders are struggling to keep their organizations alive while they learn the rules
of the capitalist game. Studies of the transitional economies have found high levels of
organizational inheritance. For instance, Pearce (1991) studied human resource
management practices in Hungary, arguably the most liberal in the former Eastern
European communist bloc, and found practices that had their origin in the now-
dysfunctional communist system of political control, but have taken on a continuing life
independent of their communist origins.
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Summarizing the arguments above, we have the following hypotheses-
HI: Bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are more likely to access state controlled
resources such as bank credits than their counterparts who do not have work
experience in the public sector.
H2: Bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs use resources such as capital less efficiently
than their counterparts who do not have work experience in the public sector.
METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE AND PROCEDURES The main data used in this study come from
a nation-wide survey of private domestic enterprises. The survey was jointly conducted in
2002 by the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) and the United
Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CCPCC).
The questionnaire was designed by a panel of scholars from the Research Division of
ACFIC, the Policy Research Office of CCPCC, People's University of China, China
Academy of Social Sciences, and Beijing Academy of Social Sciences. The dataset is by
far the best one for studying non-state enterprises in China.
Firms were selected from the population of all registered non-state enterprises in
the country's 30 provincial-level administrative regions using a multi-stage stratified
random sampling. For a sample frame, the list of private enterprises registered with the
Industry and Commerce Bureau was used. At the first stage, the number of firms to be
sampled in each province was decided based on the region's density of private enterprises.
At the second stage, the sampling units of city and county were decided according to the
proportion of private business in each province. At the third stage, for all selected cities
and counties, private enterprises were grouped according to two dimensions of geography
(rural-urban) and industries, and in each group, private enterprises were chosen randomly.
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Out of 3,635 firms sampled (e.g. .5% of the population), 2,948 firms were still in
operation and their owners were interviewed.21
Direct interviews using a questionnaire were conducted with the major owner of
each private enterprise in the sample. The survey provides information on firms'
characteristics and their key owners' social economic backgrounds. This survey is
particularly well suitable for the current study, as it asks detailed information regarding
each entrepreneur's career history, including the type of organization they had worked at,
the length of their tenure in the organizations and their final positions achieved.
MEASURES
DEPENDENT VARIABLES This paper uses several variables to measure
the different dimensions of entrepreneurial performance. These variables include
entrepreneurs' access to bank loans and the revenue of their business ventures. BANK
LOAN is a binary variable of one if the private enterprise gained loans from state owned
banks and zero otherwise. This variable offers the cleanest test of access to credit in the
present Chinese environment. LOAN COST measures the cost that entrepreneurs pay for
gaining access to state bank credit that is above and beyond the loan's interest rate. This
may be interpreted as the expenditure to invite bank and other officials for entertainment
and buy them gifts to grease the "public-relations" (Cai, Fang and Xu, 2005). The
variable LOAN COST is calculated as a percentage of the total loan granted. While the
central government sets the standard interest rates that are very rigid, the real cost of
accessing bank credits vary dramatically across borrowers. China's low official interest
rates make loan financing highly desirable and firms compete through "under the table"
deals. While pervasive, these under-the-table deals are essentially illegal activities that
are carried out through social conspiracy. Given that network ties foster trust and
21 To examine the representativeness of the data, we checked the data with various Chinese statistical yearbooks,
discovering that the survey under-sampled small firms, particularly those household enterprises with less than seven
employees. This may reflect that small firms are more likely to fail under competition and that the missing
observations may come disproportionately from this subgroup. To reduce the potential bias introduced by left
truncation, I split the data into two parts and analyze firms that had existed for two years or shortly as a robustness
check. More detailed information can be found in the discussion section.
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obligations, illegal activities are least likely to be revealed when conspired and executed
among parties with strong connected with each other (Baker and Faulkner, 1993). From
this perspective, firms with good connections (with the public sector) may have the
advantage of being trusted by bribe-receiving officials and thus can pay a lower "price"
for access to bank loans.22 I also constructed a similar variable to measure the cost of
getting loans from private parties and use this as a benchmark to see whether bureaucrats-
turned-entrepreneurs are treated differently. Given the incentives for a private loaner to
allocate credit based on firm performance and past track record of creditworthiness, I
expect that entrepreneurs without bureaucratic legacy are not going to be explicitly
discriminated again, once information regarding firm performance and entrepreneurial
capability is controlled. Furthermore, a variable FIRM REVENUE is constructed to
measure the logged size of firm revenue in the year of 2001. This transformation form
has the advantage of enabling a Cobb-Douglass production function to examine firm
efficiency using ordinary least square regressions when firms' capital size and employee
numbers are also transformed into logged value.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE The key independent variable in this study is
entrepreneurs' work experience in bureaucratic organizations. Unlike previous research
that measures bureaucracy indirectly through the size and age of parental organizations,
this paper measures the concept more directly through the type of parental organization
and looks at whether an entrepreneur has worked in a public sector organization or not.
As Wilson (1989) has argued, the public sector organizations are "the most bureaucratic
among all bureaucratic organizations", a binary variable PUBLIC SECTOR is created,
with the value of one if the entrepreneur has work experience in the public sector and
zero otherwise.
CONTROL VARIABLES To provide more accurate estimates of the
hypothesized variables, this paper controls for other factors that previous research has
found to be important in explaining entrepreneurial performance. I use two dummy
22 This is different from relationship lending in the Western context where personal ties transfer soft
information to help bankers overcome the problems of information asymmetry (Uzzi, 1999).
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variables to control for the geographic location of each firm. Previous research has shown
that private enterprises are treated more positively in the coastal area of China where
economic reforms took root early and that they are less discriminated in the rural area due
to relaxed governmental control and local state corporatism. I also control for industry
because prior research shows that industries vary in capital intensity, productivity and
priority in terms of governmental development policy. To control for industry, this paper
employs a series of dummy variables for real estate, energy, finance, construction, and
manufacture. 23 In addition, this paper controls for demographic characteristics of the
entrepreneur that may influence firm performance. These characteristics include
entrepreneur's age, gender and level of education. Similarly, several firm attributes are
controlled too, including firm age, employee level and capital level. As Chinese
governmental policy often provides preferential treatments to firms established by ethnic
minorities, a dummy variable is created to capture whether the entrepreneur is a Han
Chinese, the ethnic majority.
Chinese Communist Party membership is also used as a control variable in this
study. Although often used as an indicator of individual's political connection, party
membership is not a good measurement of bureaucratic experience. While government
agents and SOE employees often have party membership, a large number of party
members operate outside the public sector. Since the late 1990s, the party has made
deliberate efforts to attract successful people from a wide range of social economic
backgrounds into the organization (Dickson, 2003). This cooption strategy has
particularly targeted private entrepreneurs who have successfully operated outside the
state sector. From this perspective, while party membership may indicate an individual's
political connection and even capture part of his capability, it does not necessary mean
such a person has bureaucratic experience in government agencies or state owned
enterprises.
Another career experience - negative displacement -is also controlled in this study.
Shapiro and Sokol (1982) look at how change in the work situations may encourage an
23 Other industries including agriculture are the reference group in the regression.
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eventual decision to launch an entrepreneurial venture. They find that "negative
displacement" (being fired, demoted, and transferred to an undesirable location; changes
in the organization or ownership with negative career implications, etc.) is a major factor
encouraging entrepreneurship in several cultures. Of 1,394 persons who started or
purchased a business, Cooper and Dunkelberg reported 21.6 per- cent left prior
employers due to negative displacement. Out of no better alternatives, members of this
group are forced into entrepreneurship and tend to have low performance. To control for
job displacement, a binary variable LAID OFF is created with value 1 for entrepreneurs
who were laid off from previous work organizations.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Bureaucratic work
experience is positively correlated with entrepreneur's access to bank credit and firm's
revenue size. Because not all entrepreneurs find access to bank credits and/or private
loans, Table 2 reports the correlation between loan cost and other variables for the
subgroup of entrepreneurs who got loans. These results provide tentative evidence that
bureaucratic legacy provide entrepreneurs with preferential access to bank credits and
also positive performance results.
Table 3 provides the results of a regression predicting entrepreneur's access and
cost to bank credit as a function of bureaucratic legacy, controlling for other factors.
Model 1 looks at bank credit access using logistic regression, showing that bureaucratic
legacy has positive and significant effects (B = .08, S.E. = .05) on entrepreneurs' access
to state controlled financial capital. Models 2 and 3 provide the ordinary least square
(OLS) regressions predicting the cost of loans. While bureaucratic legacy dramatically
reduces the cost of bank credit (B= -.79, S.E. = .32), it does not help entrepreneurs to
reduce the cost of accessing other types of loan. Indeed, the coefficient changes direction
(B = .92, S.E. = .41). This may suggest that there is a strong selection effect in terms of
entrepreneur's pursuit of external credit. As the interest rate of the state controlled banks
is generally much lower than loans from alternative sources, entrepreneurs would give a
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priority to bank loans for finance. For other loan sources, the very act of bureaucrats-
turned-entrepreneurs seeking non-bank loans itself indicates certain weakness of the
entrepreneurs. This consequentially leads to the charging of higher fees. In combination,
these three models suggest that, in an institutional environment where state plays a
central role in credit allocation, work experience in the public sector helps entrepreneurs
to gain preferential treatment by the state banks.
Model 4 reports ordinary least square (OLS) regression results predicting firm
performance using entrepreneurs' bureaucratic legacy while controlling other variables.
A clear pattern is that bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs tend to build larger firms, as the
coefficient for the variable PUBLIC SECTOR is .20 and the standard error is .07. The
control variables provide some important insights about entrepreneurial performance. As
prior research has predicted, firms tend to have better performance when the entrepreneur
has a higher level of human capital (as measured by education, B= .23, S.E. = .04) and
when she is located in better institutional environment, e.g. the coastal area (B= .23, S.E.
=06). Moreover, the results show that firms whose entrepreneurs are party members have
better performance (B = .10, S.E. = .06), as these entrepreneurs tend to have good
connections with the government and better human capital.
To measure how efficiently bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are using financial
capital, an interaction effect is constructed between bureaucracy and capital size. While
bureaucratic experience and capital size have positive and significant impacts on firm
revenue independently (B = .39, S.E. = .17 for PUBLIC SECTOR; B = .29, S.E. = .03 for
CAPITAL), the interaction effect is significantly negative (B = -.05, S.E. = .03),
indicating that, for the same amount of capital under utilization, bureaucrats-turned-
entrepreneurs tend to be less efficient. This is an interesting comparison with
entrepreneurs who have quasi-bureaucratic experience only. While the collective sector
experience has a direct and positive effect on entrepreneurial performance, its interaction
effect with capital does not have any negative impact.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
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This paper provides the first evidence that bureaucratic legacy may serve as a
double-edged sword for entrepreneurial competence. While work experience in the public
sector helps entrepreneurs build connections with the state and get access to state
controlled resources, it hinders the development of entrepreneurial capability to use these
resources in an efficient way. This result suggests that the development of new
organizations is constrained by both the social structure and the organizational blueprint
of established organizations. While entrepreneurs set up new firms to explore new
technologies and to serve new markets, their performances are influenced by their
positions within the broad social structure and the organizational blueprints available to
them. Both factors are partly determined by the type of organization in which they have
worked previously. The empirical evidence of this study comes from a nationally
representative dataset of private enterprises in China.
While this study uses China as an empirical setting, its results may be applicable
to many transitional economies. While dismantling the former centrally planned
economic system, the transformation of socialism into some form of a market economy
does not make the state retreat from the economic domain. Political processes continue to
be central in the reform process. Both in China and in Eastern Europe, political markets
are critical to understanding transition (Parish and Michelson, 1996). As central controls
loosen, informal bargaining becomes more important, and having linkages with
influential political actors and government-based political patronage becomes much more
important. This leads some scholars to propose that "political actors will become more
important and garner more resources not only despite but also because of markets"
(Keister, 2008).
While many developing countries are not in the process of transition from a
socialist economy into a market-oriented economy, conclusions drawn from this study
may apply to them as well. Similar to transitional economies, the state also plays a central
role in defining economic and social life in developing countries and is probably the most
important single factor that influences firm performance at the micro level and economic
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growth at the macro level. While banks in these countries may not be state owned, they
are under strong governmental influence and the state often gives direct or indirect
guidance regarding credit allocation. Furthermore, as the tools for the state to carry out
economic and social policies, public sector organizations in these societies generally
control a large proportion of the national wealth and penetrate many sectors of the
national economy.
This paper uses entrepreneurs' work experience in the public sector as a
measurement of bureaucratic legacy. People may have different interpretations of what
exactly this variable measures. For instance, one may argue that, rather than bureaucratic
legacy, public sector experience may capture certain individual characteristics that
overlap with entrepreneurs' human capital. One may argue that there is a sorting process
in job allocation under the socialist system and people with high human capital (potential)
are more likely to be recruited into the public sector. Slightly different, the so-called
technocrat-continuity hypothesis argues that bureaucratic experience can serve as a good
training ground for people to gain administrative expertise under state socialism and
former cadres can rely on such expertise to maintain high socioeconomic status in post-
socialist era. For instance, Rona-Tas (1994:45) argues, "There is a common meritocratic-
technocratic character of both party and entrepreneurial recruitment that is the main
source of continuity". To put it another way, cadre status provides the opportunities to
acquire administrative expertise. Such expertise is a special form of human capital. It is
marketable under the new economic regime not for its linkage with the state actor for
access to resources but for its high efficiency in utilizing resources. This implies that the
interaction term between bureaucracy and capital should have a positive effect on firm
revenue. However, this is exactly the opposite of what I have found in this study. Thus,
this study has minimal concern with this human capital interpretation of public sector
experience.
One may also concern that political connections explain both bureaucrat-
entrepreneurs' access to and low efficiency of capital, as politically connected
entrepreneurs are more likely to privatize state owned enterprises that operate
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inefficiently. From this perspective, it is not public sector experience that constrains
individuals from developing entrepreneurial competence, but that state owned enterprises
themselves are not efficient and it is hard to change their organizational routines for
performance improvement. Evidence supports the argument that cadres took advantage of
their political power to acquire state property through privatization. However, this paper
is not subject to accusation of this line of argument, as I have created a control variable
(PRIVATIZED) to capture whether a firm is created from scratch by the entrepreneur or
from the change of ownership during privatization. Surprisingly, adding this variable
does not change any of the statistical results (see Model 7), showing that privatized SOEs
do not behave differently from other firms in any fundamental way!
Another concern is that easy access to bank loans, rather than bureaucratic legacy
per se, explains bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs' low efficiency in financial capital
utilization. As bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs have easy access to cheap credit in China
(see Models 1 & 2), they have incentives to use capital, the relatively cheap production
factor, to substitute the expensive ones and thus it is natural for the interaction term of
capital and bureaucratic experience to have a negative sign in regressions. To reduce this
concern, several robustness tests are conducted (see Table5). Model 8 looks at the cases
where firms have gained bank loans. After controlling for the "public relations
expenditure" of bank loans, the interaction term between capital size and bureaucratic
experience continues to have a negative coefficient (B =-0.33) that is statistically
significant at .10 level for one-tailed test 24. As shown in Models 9 and 10, controlling
firms' access to bank loans does not change the empirical pattern either. These results
reduce concerns of the rival hypothesis of "cheap loans inducing low inefficiency in
capital utilization".
Several limitations in this paper are worthwhile acknowledging for the purpose of
future improvement. First, this study treats an individual's career choice as exogenously
determined by factors that have no direct impact upon the development of entrepreneurial
24 One thing to note is that all regressions in Table 5 report one-tailed significance test, due to the relatively
small number of observations in the analyses.
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competence. This assumption needs to be relaxed and career option should be explicitly
modeled in future research. One possible solution to this issue is to use father's education
level (Bellante and Link, 1981) and work experience (Blank, 1985) as instruments for
individuals' career choice. Even though such an approach has been utilized in prior
studies (Ozcan and Reichstein, 2009), theoretically, parental education and career
influence both individuals' career choice and their accumulation of human and social
capital (Sorenson, 2004). Thus these two factors may impact entrepreneurial performance
through mechanisms other than career choice, making them invalid instrumental
variables.
Second, this study does not open up the black box of organizational imprinting.
While the empirical results are in alignment with the theoretical argument that the
transfer of bureaucratic legacy into new enterprises through the turnover of public sector
employees makes these new enterprises inefficient, this paper does not model directly the
transfer of organizational routines or culture. This leaves the door open for rival
interpretations. For instance, one may contribute both the positive, direct bureaucratic
impact and the negative, indirect bureaucratic impact on firm revenue to unobservable
sector effect. Or put another way, bureaucrats-turned- entrepreneurs can utilize their
political connections to enter industrial sectors that are formerly monopolized by the state.
When these sectors are of low competition yet capital intensive, regression analysis will
show a positive direct effect of bureaucracy (due to the lucrative profit that these sectors
provide) and a negative indirect effect of bureaucracy (due to capital intensity in these
sectors)25. While this study has industrial dummies as control variables, industrial sectors
are aggregated at very high levels. Without fine-grained information, it is hard for us to
rule out the potential sector effect.
25 Regression analysis of entry choice does show that bureaucrats-turned-entrepreneurs are more likely to
enter the lucrative yet capital intensive real estate sector. This result will be reported in the next version of
the paper.
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Last but not least important. the data in this study are left-truncated and this may
introduce a survivor bias into the study26 . Firms in the data were surveyed in 2002 and
most of them have survived more than four years. Studies have suggested that only 50%
of the firms can survive up to four years. To reduce the concern of left truncation, I split
the data and ran an analysis of firms that were established after 1999 only. The statistical
results in Model 6 show that the basic patterns as predicted by the theory continue to hold:
entrepreneurs with work experience in governmental agencies and the state owned
enterprises tend to build large yet inefficient firms. Even though the number of
observations is small (n= 222), the coefficients for PUBLIC SECTOR (B=1.03) and the
interaction term of public sector and capital size (B= -0.20) continue to hold statistical
significance (Standard errors are .60 and .12 respectively) 27. Indeed, the comparison
between the coefficients of bureaucracy related variables in Model 6 and Model 5 can be
very revealing. These coefficients are much stronger for entrepreneurs who just left the
public sector recently. This may indicate that bureaucracy effects are discounted over
time: the longer an entrepreneur has left the public sector, the weaker his connections
with the state become and the less he is constrained by the inherited inefficient
organizational routines28.
26 Namely, given their limited access to state controlled resources that are important to firm survival,
entrepreneurs without bureaucratic experience that manage to survive for a long period must possess
certain unique capability that distinguish them from the rest of the population. This unique (yet
unobservable) capability may well explain why they are more efficient in utilizing resources that are
available to them.
27 However, for models predicting bank credit access and loan costs, the coefficients are in the right
direction as predicted by the theory, but they do not have statistical significance. The results are not
reported here.
28 Roberts (1991: 117, 121) shows this very effect for the technology connection of new firms with their
parental organizations in the American context.
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APPENDIX:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1Bank loan 1.00
2 Revenue 0.25 1.00
3 Public sector 0.06 0.06 1.00
4 Collective sector 0.06 0.06 -0.28 1.00
5 Capital 0.28 0.68 0.05 0.04 1.00
6 Labor 0.32 0.67 -0.05 0.10 0.62 1.00
7 Male 0.07 0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.11 0.08 1.00
8 Education -0.05 0.20 0.31 -0.11 0.21 0.10 -0.03 1.00
9 Han Chinese 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 1.00
10 Party member 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.03 -0.04 1.00
11 Laid off -0.03 -0.12 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
12 Big City 0.18 -0.04 -0.26 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.08 -0.25 0.03 0.11 -0.02 1.00
13 Coast -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.08 0.10 1.00
14 Manufacturing 0.16 0.11 -0.19 0.16 0.09 0.23 0.06 -0.16 0.03 0.12 -0.03 0.29 0.07 1.00
15 Energy -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 1.00
16 Construction 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.21 -0.02 1.00
17 Finance -0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 1.00
18 Real Estate 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
19 Firm Age 0.02 0.04 -0.13 -0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.13 0.01 -0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Variables
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Variables, continued
Bank loan cost Other loan cost
Bank loan cost 1.00 0.09
Other loan cost 0.09 1.00
Revenue -0.07 0.02
Public sector -0.02 0.03
Collective sector -0.04 0.05
Capital 0.02 0.00
Labor -0.05 0.03
Male 0.05 0.02
Education 0.04 0.07
Han Chinese -0.03 0.04
Party member -0.06 0.04
Laid off 0.04 -0.06
Big city -0.04 0.04
Coast -0.15 0.01
Manufacturing -0.05 0.05
Energy 0.00 0.03
Construction -0.04 -0.06
Finance -0.01 -0.02
Real Estate 0.03 0.00
Firm Age 0.05 -0.05
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Table 3: Models Predicting Entrepreneurial Finance
Modell:Bank Credit Access Model 2: Bank Loan Cost Model 3: Other Loan Cost
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Public sector 0.08* 0.05 -0.79*** 0.32 0.92** 0.41
Collective sector 0.09 0.09 -0.35 0.30 1.28*** 0.40
Capital 0.09*** 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.16
Labor 0.28*** 0.04 -0.37*** 0.15 0.12 0.19
Firm Age 0.03*** 0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.04
Big City 0.26*** 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.18
Coast -0.51*** 0.09 -1.12*** 0.30 -0.55 0.38
Male 0.27** 0.14 0.96* 0.53 0.29 0.62
Education -0.04 0.05 0.29* 0.18 0.62** 0.24
Han Chinese 0.33 0.22 -0.39 0.73 0.63 0.81
Party member 0.15* 0.09 -0.01 0.31 -0.03 0.41
Laid off -0.15 0.2 1.60*** 0.71 -1.11 0.82
Manufacturing 0.45*** 0.1 -0.77** 0.32 0.12 0.43
Energy -0.21 0.53 -2.03 1.90 2.21 2.50
Construction -0.07 0.19 -1.27** 0.62 -2.08** 0.87
Real Estate 0.72*** 0.24 -1.09 0.74 -1.47 1.05
Constant -2.64*** 0.35 2.41** 1.19 0.12 1.44
n 2571 1063 1297
d.f. 16 16 16
Adj. R-Square 0.09 0.04 0.02
Note: * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p<.01 in two-tailed tests.
Model 1 looks at the full sample and predicts firms' access to bank loans; Logistic regression
analysis is used. Model2 and model 3 look at entrepreneurs who gained loans from the state
bank and non-bank loan sources respectively, predicting the cost of gaining loans. Ordinary least
square regressions are used.
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Table 4: Results of Ordinary Least Square Models Predicting Firm Performance
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Public sector 0.20*** 0.07 0.39** 0.17 1.03* 0.60 0.39** 0.17
Collective sector 0.13** 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.25 0.59 0.16 0.17
Capital 0.27*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.03 0.44*** 0.11 0.29*** 0.03
Labor 0.40*** 0.03 0.40*** 0.03 0.50*** 0.08 0.40*** 0.03
Firm age 0.06*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 -0.27 0.20 0.06*** 0.01
Big city -0.11*** 0.03 -0.11*** 0.03 -0.16* 0.09 -0.11*** 0.03
Coast 0.23*** 0.06 0.23*** 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.23*** 0.06
Male 0.37*** 0.10 0.37*** 0.10 0.35 0.30 0.37*** 0.10
Education 0.23*** 0.04 0.23*** 0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.23*** 0.04
Han Chinese 0.34** 0.16 0.34** 0.16 -0.28 0.55 0.34** 0.16
Party member 0.10* 0.06 0.10* 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.10* 0.06
Laid off -0.38*** 0.14 -0.38*** 0.14 -0.61* 0.36 -0.38*** 0.14
Manufacturing 0.29*** 0.07 0.29*** 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.29*** 0.07
Energy 0.08 0.34 0.09 0.34 0.51 1.33 0.09 0.34
Construction 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.39 0.20 0.13
Real Estate 0.64*** 0.17 0.65*** 0.17 1.25*** 0.47 0.65*** 0.17
Public sector X
Capital -0.05* 0.03 -0.20* 0.12 -0.05* 0.03
Collective sector X Capital -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.04
Privatized 0.03 0.07
Constant 1.72*** 0.24 1.62*** 0.27 2.51*** 0.91 1.62*** 0.27
n 2247 2247 222 2247
d.f. 16 18 18 19
Adj. R-Square 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.31
Note: * p<.10; ** p <.05; *** p< .01 in two-tailed tests.
The dependent variables in these models are the logged value of firm revenue. Models 4, 5 and
7 use the full sample; Model 6 uses the subsample of firms that had existed for one or two years.
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Table 5: Results of Ordinary Least Square Models Predicting Firm Performance
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E.
Public sector 1.85** 1.02 1.00** 0.61 1.06** 0.62
Collective sector 0.98 0.98 0.40 0.61 0.43 0.62
Capital 0.25* 0.19 0.44*** 0.11 0.45*** 0.09
Labor 0.59*** 0.11 0.47*** 0.08 0.47*** 0.08
Party member 0.12 0.30 0.02 0.20 -0.03 0.21
Laid off -0.76*** 0.14 -0.61* 0.41 -0.61* 0.41
Public sector X Capital -0.33* 0.21 -0.18* 0.13 -0.19* 0.13
Collective sector X Capital -0.02 0.20 -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.12
Bank loan cost -0.12 0.05
Bank loan access 0.46** 0.20 0.45** 0.20
Privatized 0.14 0.23
Other controls YES YES YES
n 87 216 216
d.f. 18 19 20
Adj. R-Square 0.51 0.48 0.48
Note: one-tailed test. *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01. The following variables are controlled in all
models: firm age, firm location (big city, coast), industrial dummies (manufacturing, energy,
construction, and real estate), and entrepreneurial background (male, education and Han
Chinese).
Model 8 looks at firms younger than 3 years old with access to state bank loans. The energy
sector drops out in model 8. Models 9 and 10 look at firms younger than 3 years old, no matter
whether they got access to state bank loans.
147
